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THE UNEASY CASE FOR DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
CONTROL OF FEDERAL LITIGATION 
Neal Devins· & Michael Herz•• 
INTRODUCTION 
On the cover of a recent annual report, the United States De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) billed itself as: "The Nation's Litigator-
Yesterday ... today ... tomorrow." 1 The claim has some truth to it 
and may be, as Justice Scalia likes to say, good enough for govern-
ment work. But it is incorrect as to yesterday (or at least as to the day 
before yesterday, since DOJ did not even come into existence until 
1870), and an exaggeration as a description of today's practice. In 
this article, we will consider whether it is, or should be, inaccurate 
also as a prediction of who will be the nation's litigator "tomorrow." 
This symposium's topic posits a particular opponent: the govern-
ment. In the actual struggle of litigation, however, the opponent is in 
a very real sense not the nominal jJarty on the other side of the case; it 
is the attorney representing that party. In this paper, we examine not 
the government as a party to a lawsuit, nor the substantive or proce-
dural rules that control litigation against the government. Rather, we 
are concerned with the lawyers representing the government. TI1e 
identity, priorities, skills, and role of those lawyers play a not insig-
nificant role in determining the nature and outcome of litigation 
against the government. 
In general, the lawyers in litigation against the government are 
from DOJ. The prevailing rule is that federal agencies hold their own 
legal counsel, but if they find themselves in court they are repre-
sented by DOJ. This arrangement has built-in tensions for the par-
ticipants, and almost all agencies have chafed under it at times. 
Though this is the standard arrangement, it is by no means the exclu-
sive one. To a greater degree than is often realized or acknowledged, 
though without any particular pattern or underlying theory, Congress 
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has placed responsibility for government lawyering with attorneys 
outside DOJ. 
In this article, we cast a fresh eye on the standard arguments for 
DO] control of litigation. We conclude that the case is not nearly as 
compelling as generally assumed. Nonetheless, in the final analysis 
our proposals for reform are minor. It is for this reason that we have 
borrowed our title from Harry Kalven and Walter Blum's classic book, 
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation. 2 Kalven and Blum took a care-
ful look at a phenomenon everyone assumed made sense-
progressive income tax rates-and found the case to be surprisingly 
"uneasy." We conclude, similarly, that the case for centralizing litigat-
ing authority in DOJ is also surprisingly uneasy. 
We divide our comments into three parts. In Part I, we detail the 
different lawyering tasks performed by DOJ and government agen-
cies. This discussion will also highlight differences between types of 
cases: criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement, as well as the 
defense of agency decisions. Part II identifies and assesses the tradi-
tional arguments advanced in favor of DO] control of government 
litigation. This assessment will call attention to shortcomings in the 
traditional arguments. In Part III, we argue that in two categories of 
cases, namely (1) trial, but not appellate proceedings, in civil en-
forcement and (2) petitions for judicial review of regulations, litiga-
tion authority should be transferred to agency lawyers. We also con-
clude, however, that in other settings DOJ control makes sense. 
I. LA WYERS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
A. The Structure of Federal Lawyering 
Prior to 1870, the federal government's legal affairs were handled 
in a diffuse and decentralized manner. The Attorney General had 
no, or virtually no, staff; district attorneys (as U.S. Attorneys were 
then called) operated without centralized control; and much of the 
work was farmed out to private counsel. There existed what one au-
thor has labeled a state of "near anarchy in the nation's legal affairs.,~ 
The key step toward centralization was creation of DO] in 1870. 
Congress had two primary goals. First, it sought to eliminate the reli-
ance on private lawyers in litigation. Handling government lawsuits 
with lawyers working for the government itself would be more effi-
cient, ensure consistent litigating positions, and provide high quality 
2 
WALTER j. BLUM & I-lARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 
(1953). 
' NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE AlTORNEY GENERAL'S 
OFFICE, 1789-1990, at 49 ( 1992) . 
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lawyering. In addition, and apparently most important, it would be 
less expensive than relying on outside counsel. Second, and no less 
weighty, Congress sought to centralize the counseling function. 4 Ac-
cordingly, the 1870 Act creating DO] provided that the legal officers 
of other departments "shall exercise their functions under the super-
vision and control of the head of the Department of justice."" 
The 1870 centralization never quite took hold. Attorneys within 
the departments retained significant independence both as to litiga-
tion and counseling. It was with the New Deal that the modern 
framework was put in place. By executive order,'; pursuant to con-
gressionally delegated reorganization authority,' the Attorney Gen-
eral was given control of nearly all the litigation of the federal gov-
ernment; however, agencies were left to conduct their own internal 
legal and counseling work without DO] interference.H 
In general, then, the Department of Justice is the litigator for the 
United States and its administrative agencies.n Agencies may not em-
ploy outside counsel for litigation and must refer all matters to DOJ. 10 
< SeeCONC. GLOIIE, 41st Con g., 2d Sess. 3036 (April 27, 1870) (remarks of Rep.Jenckes) ; id. 
at 3038 (remarks of Rep. bnvrence) ("One great object of this bill is to provide a law otlicer 
whose opinion shall be asked upon all questions admitting of doubt, and whose opinions shall 
become the rule of action for the Department~ and for the several heads of bureaus."); id. at 
3065-66 (April 28, 1870) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 4490 Uune 16, 1870) (remarks of 
Sen . Patterson) (noting the "absolute necessity of harmony in the legal business of the Gov-
ernment" and arguing that a benefit of having a department ofjustice would be that "the opin· 
ions given by the law officers of the Government will be a unit, will be in harmony with each 
other"). 
''Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (creating the Department of Justice). For addi-
tional discussion, see Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Dent, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237 
(1996) . 
'' Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933) , nprinted in5 U.S.C.A. § 901 (1996) . 
7 Act of March 3,1933, Pub. L. No. 72-428,47 Stat. 1489,1517. 
" On the division of labor with regard to counseling, see infra notes 44-49, 124-26 and ac-
companying text. 
" 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000) ("Except as othetwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation 
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing 
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of 
the Attorney General."); id. at§ 519: 
Except as othetwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation 
to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all 
United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys appointed 
under section 543 of this title in the discharge of their respective duties. 
See aLro id. at § 518(a) (giving the Attorney General and the Solicitor General comrol of federal 
litigation before the Supreme Court); 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (2002) (giving the Solicitor General 
control of federal litigation before the Supreme Court) . Agency lawyers do represent their 
agencies in formal administrative adjudications, which are trial-type proceedings but do not 
qualify as "litigation" within the meaning of these provisions. 
111 See5 U.S.C. § 3106 (2000): 
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an Exewtive department or military 
department may not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which 
the United States, an agency, or employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the 
securing of evidence therefore, but shall refer the mauer to the Department ofjustice. 
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Although this is the standard arrangement, the law does "otherwise 
authorize" with surprising frequency. Congress has significantly 
eroded the Attorney General's role as chief litigator for the United 
States, vesting at least some independent litigating authority in ap-
proximately three-dozen governmental entities, ranging from Con-
gress itself, to independent regulatory agencies, to governmental 
corporations, to executive departments and agencies. 11 Not surpris-
ingly, independent litigatin9 authority is especially common among 
the independent agencies. 1 In this Section, we lay out the basic 
model and its variations. 
1. Criminal Prosecutions 
DO] is particularly dominant in criminal prosecutions. Uni-
formly, DOJ lawyers handle criminal prosecutions; even agencies that 
otherwise handle their own litigation lack authority to initiate or 
prosecute a criminal case. Most agencies have criminal investigators, 
but if the agency decides a criminal prosecution is warranted, it must 
refer the case to D0f3 Furthermore, DO] has its own criminal inves-
tigatory apparatus14 and can pursue a prosecution even without an 
agency referral. 15 In addition, DOJ by no means automatically pur-
sues a criminal referral. For example, declination rates in the earl~ 
years of environmental criminal enforcement were as high as 60%; 6 
11 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Indepmdent Agency 
Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 263-64, 269-70 (1994). Former Attorney General Griffin Bell 
counted with dismay "thirty-one separate units of the federal government [that] have authority 
to conduct at least some of their own litigation." GRIFFIN B. BELL, WITH RONALD j. OSTROW, 
TAKING CARE OF TI-lE LAw 176 (1982). See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. hwin, 727 F. Supp. 
1073 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding, contrary to DOJ's argument, that the FDIC has independent 
litigating authority); Comptroller of the Currency v. Lance, 632 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Ga. 1986) 
(holding that the Comptroller has independent litigating authority). 
12 For a thorough description of the litigating authority (among other characteristics) of 32 
independent agencies, boards, and commissions, see Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Estab-
lished by Practice: The Themy and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 
1236-94 (2000). 
13 For a full account of the process of criminal investigation and prosecution in one particu-
lar setting, see ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITI': AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS (Donald A. Carr ed., 1995) . 
14 Between 1988 and 1993, for example, over 61% of environmental cases considered for 
criminal prosecution were referred by EPA and 34% were developed by DOJ investigators, with 
almost all of the latter coming from the FBI. See EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Be-
fm-e the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d 
Con$·· 1st Sess. 78 ( 1993) (statement of L. Nye Stevens) [hereinafter 1993 Dingell Hearing]. 
I.• United States Attorney's Manual,§ 5-11.110 (8/23/94 Bluesheet). 
16 Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmmtal Criminal 
Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 907 (1991) (describing period 
from 1979-81). On the tension between EPA and DOJ over the quality of the agency's criminal 
referrals, see WILLIAMJ. CORCORAN ET AL., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNAL REVIEW 
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in the last decade DO] has reportedly declined Security & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) referrals at about the same rate. 17 In short, in a 
criminal case DOJ represents the United States, not the apency, and 
its decision whether to prosecute is relatively autonomous.' 
If DOJ does pursue a criminal prosecution, agency lawyers have 
little or no involvement in the actual lawyering. In civil cases, DOJ 
takes tl1e lead but agency lawyers may be part of the litigating team. 
In criminal cases, the agency is wholly in the background, only help-
ing to build a case. For example, each Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Region has a Regional Criminal Enforcement Counsel 
(RCEC), but that office works to prepare cases, not to litigate them or 
present them to a grand jury. Indeed, the RCEC's status as odd man 
out in criminal prosecutions has been a source of tension between 
the agency and the department. 19 
2. Civil judicial Enforcement 
When it comes to civil judicial enforcement actions, the arrange-
ments are more variable. However, there is one significant and con-
sistent difference between criminal and civil actions: in the latter, 
DO] will not proceed without a client. In the words of the U.S. At-
torney's Manual, "[a]s a matter of policy and practice, civil prosecu-
tions are initiated at the request of the" relevant agency head.20 In-
deed, the most plausible reading of the statutes is that DOJ could not 
proceed in a civil case without the agency even if it wanted to. 
Should DOJ learn of possible violations warranting investigation, it 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF jUSTICE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM (1994) [hereinafter DOJ 
INTERNAL REVIEW) . 
17 Walter Hamilton, CorfJorate Scandals Bring Calls fm'}ail, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at CI (re-
porting that in the last decade the SEC has referred 523 cases for criminal prosecution, of 
which DOJ pursued 231 and rejected 292, or 56%). See also Clifton Leaf et al., White-Collar 
Criminals: Enough is Enough, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60 (reporting that from 1992 to 2001 
the SEC referred 609 cases and that DOJ acted on 525 of those cases, of which it declined to 
prosecute just over 64%). Both of these sources base their figures on searches of the Transac-
tion Records Access Clearing House (TRAC), a web-based data clearinghouse at Syracuse Uni-
versity. 
1
' Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of lntegr'lltion in the Avolution of Environmental Law: 
RefonningEnvimnmental Criminal Law, 83 CEO. LJ. 2407,2460 (1995). 
1
" DOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 16 (noting that disputes over the proper role of RCECs 
are "[a]nother source of tension between the EPA" and Justice's Environmental Crimes Sec-
tion); see also Letter from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Otlice of Criminal Enforcement, to 
Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Divi-
sion, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1992), reprinted in 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 420, 421 (noting 
that a "division ... has infused itself between our two agencies" characterized by a "'them vs. us' 
perception that we have long been working to overcome"). 
'" United States Attorney's Manual,§ 5-12-111 (a). 
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forwards the information to the agency; an actual civil action will not 
go forward without a referral from the agency to DOJ.21 
While it is consistently true that DOJ will not pursue a civil en-
forcement action without an agency referral, how cases are brought 
varies. In the most common arrangement, an agency has no author-
ity to bring civil actions on its own. When the agency wishes to go to 
court it prepares a referral package, describing the case and justifying 
the need for judicial action, which it sends to the relevant division or 
section within DOJ. The decision whether to proceed, and then the 
actual handling of the litigation if such a decision is made, is in the 
hands of DO]. Cases generally begin with an agency's regional office. 
The role that agency headquarters has in screening or preparing re-
ferrals changes over time and varies depending on the agency and on 
the type of case.22 Whatever the internal arrangements, preparation 
of a referral memo tends to be a serious and time-consuming under-
taking, producing a fairly lengthy document and voluminous sup-
porting materials. 
Under this standard arrangement, DOJ has two key powers: it de-
cides whether or not a case goes to court and, if it does go to court, it 
handles the lawyering. Elimination of either of these roles shifts 
power to the agency. Consider the Fair Housing Act and its 1988 
Amendments. Complaints alleging housing discrimination are filed 
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). If 
the agency determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
discrimination has in fact occurred, it in turn files a charge with the 
Office of Administrative Law Judges. At that point, either party can 
"elect" to have the case adjudicated in federal district court rather 
than before an ALJ. In a majority of cases, such an election is made.23 
21 /d. at§ 5-12-111 (b). 
22 For example, within the Food and Drug Administration, the regional offices prepare a 
referrdl package, but it is the Office of the Chief Counsel that authorizes the referral and signs 
the cover letter. See FDA OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL 
2001 (chapter 6, ':Judicial Actions," injunctions subchapter), availab/R. at http:/ /www.fda.gov/ 
ora/compliance_ref/rpm_new2/ch6.html#pu (last visited Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. 
FDA]. Within the EPA, in the 1970s and 1980s refemtls went through headquarters. In 1988, 
the policy was changed to allow direct referral of most but not all cases from the Regional Of-
fice to DOJ, with a copy provided to EPA headquarters. See Mem. From Tho-
mas L. Adams, Ass't Admin., USEPA, to Regional Administrators et al., available at 
http:/ hV\\w.epa.gov I Com pi iance/ resources/ policies/cleanup/ su perfund/ expand-ref-
mem.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2003) (regarding "Expansion of Direct Referral of Cases to the 
Department of Justice"). Thereafter, practice has continued to vary, although a key question 
has consistently been whether a case is of "national significance." 
23 From 1989 until 1998, one or the other party elected to proceed in district court in 913 
(64.8%) of the 1408 cases in which HUD made a reasonable cause finding. MICHAEL H. SCHILL 
& SAMANTHA FRIEDMAN, C'rR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URB. POL'Y, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF l.AW, 
ENFORCING THE FAIR HOUSING ACr: A REPORT TO THE U.S. DEI''T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. 52 
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In cases that stay before an ALJ, HUD and the complainant are rep-
resented by an attorney from HUD's Office of General Counsel. In 
election cases, HUD and the complainant are represented by an at-
torney from DOJ. As a practical matter, then, DOJ cannot decline to 
24 pursue an enforcement action. As long as HUD has made the req-
uisite probable cause finding, and one or the other party has elected 
to proceed in district court, the case goes forward and DOJ must 
handle it. Thus, DOJ is still the lawyer, but it is not the gatekeeper.25 
In some settings, however, DOJ acts as neither lawyer nor gate-
keeper. A number of agencies handle civil judicial enforcement on 
their own. Among the executive agencies, the Department of Labor 
is the primary example.26 This arrangement is more common among 
the independent agencies. For example, the SEC handles all of its 
own civil enforcement litigation.27 The Commission has a large Divi-
sion of Enforcement, with scores of attorneys, accountants, and inves-
tigators and its own counsel's office. The Enforcement Division con-
ducts a preliminary review of a case; with approval of the SEC 
General Counsel and the Commissioners it can then pursue an in-
formal inquiry; with further approval of the General Counsel and the 
Commissioners and issuance by the latter of a Formal Order of Inves-
tigation, it can pursue a further investigation. Final decision as to 
termination, settlement, administrative enforcement, civiljudicial en-
(2000) . The rate varied from year to year, with a peak of 74.4% in 1995 and a low of 44.9% in 
1998 (the only year in the study period in which the election rate was below 50%). !d. 
•• This arrangement does not apply to all types of Fair Housing Act cases. For example, 
HUD can refer "pattern or practice" cases to DOJ, which the Department can pursue or not as 
it sees fit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(e) (2), 3614(a) (2000) . Unusually, DOJ can also pursue such cases 
without a referral. Indeed, between 1992 and 1998, DOJ filed over fifty "pattern or practice" 
suits resulting from its own investigations without HUD referrals. John Reiman, Fedeml Fair 
Housing Enforcement: '17!e Second Clinton Administration, in THE TEST OF OUR PROGRESS: THE 
CLINTON RECORD ON CIVIL RIGHTS 231 (Corrine Yu & William Taylor eds., 1999). 
"' This is not to say that this arrangement is devoid of the tensions that arise from the gate· 
keeping function. For example, DOJ is authorized to decline to pursue an action if new legal 
developments or new evidence cast doubt on HUD's underlying reasonable cause dete rmina-
tion. HUD has objected that DQJ returns cases, in contravention of its statutory obligation to 
pursue them, simply because it disagrees with the substantive underpinnings of the reasonable 
cause determination ; DOJ has maintained that it returns cases only when new information or 
developments indicate them to be frivolous. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING 
AMENDMENTS ACTS OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 213-14 (1994) . The Civil Rights Com-
mission has chided DOJ for being insufficiently deferential to HUD, and recommended that 
DOJ should authorize HUD attorneys to pursue cases that DOJ cannot or will not pursue. ld. at 
231. 
'" See, e.g., 29 U .S.C. § 663 (2000) (providing that "the Solicitor of Labor may appear for and 
represent the Secretary in any civil litigation brought under [the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act] but all such litigation shall be sul~ect to the direction and control of the Attorney 
General"); id. at§ 2005(b) (providing that the Solicitor may represent the Secretary in actions 
under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act); id. at § 2617(e) (providing same for actions 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act) . 
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b)-(d) , 78u(c)-(e) (2000). 
HeinOnline -- 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L.  565 2002 - 2003
Apr. 2003] DO} CON71WL OFFf.LJEUAL L/71GA710N 565 
forcement, or referral to DOJ for criminal prosecution is made by the 
Commissioners upon the recommendation of the Division of En-
forcement and the General Counsel.~H If a civil judicial enforcement 
action is brought, the lawyering is handled by the Division of En-
forcement. 
The SEC's ability to pursue civil enforcement actions on its own 
seems to have had two consequences worth noting here. First, it is 
striking that the agency itself has developed several layers of internal 
review, in some ways duplicating, if not exceeding, the process of DO] 
review of agency referrals that exists for agencies without litigating 
authority. The "winding road that an enforcement action follows at 
the Commission ... is tortuous at best and lengthy, with numerous 
layers of bureaucratic review."~9 Second, because it is not forced to 
choose between enforcement alternatives, the SEC sometimes pur-
sues more than one at the same time. In a significant number of 
cases, for example, the Commission pursues civil judicial relief in a 
case that DOJ is prosecuting criminally.30 Similarly, the Commission 
may pursue a matter through simultaneous civil judicial and adminis-
trative enforcement actions.3 1 
3. Administrative Enforcement 
In general, criminal prosecutions are understood to be the top of 
a pyramid of enforcement alternatives. Civil judicial cases are a tier 
below, and at the broad bottom of the pyramid are administrative 
proceedings.32 While possible monetary penalties can be comparable 
in all three regimes,33 in practice, penalties actually imposed are, not 
surprisingly, smaller in administrative cases than in judicial cases.:H In 
28 See Thad A. Davis, A New Model of Securities Law Enforcement, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 69, 99-103 
(2001). 
29 /d. at 99. 
30 !d. at 106. Davis estimates that approximately 10% of the SEC's judicial civil enforcement 
cases have parallel criminal proceedings. /d. at 85-86. 
'" SeeThe Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market Integ-
rity, available at http:/ /www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#org (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) (de-
scribing enforcement options and stating that "[o]ften, when the misconduct warran ts it, the 
Commission will bring both" administrative and civil judicial enforcement actions against the 
same wrongdoe r). 
32 For a literal depiction of this pyramid, see 1994 EPA FY ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
AsSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REI'., figs . 2-1, 2-2 (1995) , available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/ resources/reports/planning/ results/ fy94accomplishmen t.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 
2003) [hereinafter 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REP.] . 
33 Under the Clean Air Act, for example, civil judicial penalties and administrative penalties 
both have a maximum of $25,000 per day per violation, although the latter cannot exceed a 
total of $200,000. Clean Air Act,§§ 113(b), (d)( I) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), (d) (I) (2000) . 
""' Thus for fiscal year 1999, the EPA obtained civil judicial penalties of over $141.2 million 
while it imposed 1,654 administrative penalties totaling $25.5 million. EPA, ANNUAL REP. ON 
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general, the majority of enforcement matters are handled administra-
tively through actions ranging from informal, cooperative undertak-
ings, through a warning letter or a notice of violation, with a view to 
informal discussion and resolution, through an order requiring com-
pliance, to agency imposed penalties.~'' With the rarest of exceptions, 
administrative enforcement proceedings are handled by agency at-
torneys. DO] is simply not involved (unless, of course, the agency's 
final decision is challenged in court). 
We have written elsewhere that these two phenomena are linked; 
that is, that one reason for agencies' strong preference for adminis~ 
trative enforcement is freedom from DO] overs~ght and control.3" 
This conclusion is further borne out by an examination of the more 
balanced ratio of administrative to civil Judicial enforcement actions 
in agencies that have litigating authority. 7 
ENFORCEMENT AND COMI'LIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1999, at B-5, B-7 (2000}, 
available at h up:/ /www.epa.gov I com pi iance / resources/ reports/planning/ resuiL~/fy99accomp­
lishment.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2003} [hereinafter 1999 EPA ENFORCEMENT REP.] . Criminal 
fines assessed were less than civil tines, bm were handed out on top of prison sentences: 322 
criminal defendants were assessed over $61.5 million in fines and 208 years in prison. /d. Five 
years earlier, the gap between civil judicial and administrative penalties was small but still sig· 
nificant; in FY 1994 the 166 civil defendants were assessed almost $65.7 million in penalties 
while the 1596 administrative penalty orders totaled $48 million. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REP., 
sufJm note 32, at 4-5, 4-6. The 250 criminal defendants were assessed $36.8 million in fin es and 
99 years in prison . /d. at 4-2. One would expect that in the current administration the gap be-
tween civil and administrative penalties would narrow, and that both judicial and criminal e nvi-
ronmental enforcement would decline. 
"' In fiscal year 1999, the EPA made 21,847 regional inspections and issued 1,516 admin is-
trative compliance orders and 1,654 adminisu~nive penalty order complaints. 1999 EPA 
ENFORCEM~:NT REP., sufmt note 34, at B-3. There were administrative penalty selllements in 
1,358 cases. /d. at B-4. During the same period there were only 403 new civil referrals and 241 
criminal referrals from the EPA to DOJ. !d. at B-4, B-5. 
"" Michael Herz & Neal Devins, 'f7u Conseqwmr.es of DO} Control of Litigation on Agencies' Pro-
grams, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1369-71 (2000}. 
37 For example, the SEC has regularly initiated almost as many civil judicial actions as 
administrative proceed ings. The following table comes from its 2001 Annual Report: 
FY97 FY98 I·Y99 WOO fYOJ 
Civil .Judicia l Actions 189 214 198 223 205 
Administrative Proceedings 285 248 298 244 248 
Contempt Proceedings 14 15 29 36 31 
Reports of Investigation 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 489 477 525 503 484 
2001 SEC ANN. REP. I, available at http:/ /www.sec.gov/about/annrep 01. shtml (last visited Apr. 
12, 2003}. This stands in contrast to the ratio of administr,ttive proceedings compared to civil 
actions initiated at. other agencies with less litigating authority. See supra note 35. The contrast 
is probably not solely the result of the different litigating arrangements. It likely also stems 
from the fact that historically, the SEC's administrative enforcement powers were significantly 
less potent than it~ civil judicial enforcement powers. For an overview, see Mathew Scott Morris, 
'17w Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock l?Pform A ct of 1990: By KeejJing Up With the Joneses, 
the SEC's Enforcement Arsmwl is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 151 (1993}. In some cases, the 
SEC now has significant. administrative enforcement authority, including the power to impose 
"civil penalties comparable to those obtainable in court." Barbara Black &Jill I. Gross, Making it 
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4. Defensive Actions 
The government is not always the plaintiff. Indeed, most of the 
articles in this symposium are devoted to settings in which the gov-
ernment is the defendant or respondent. Agency lawyers provide ad-
vice on legal issues surrounding the action now being challenged-be 
it a final regulation (or the failure to promulgate one), denial (or 
grant) of a permit, imposition of an administrative penalty, the 
agency's own failure to comply with regulatory requirements, or 
whatever. But once the matter is the subject of a lawsuit, DO] gener-
ally takes over, as in the case of civil enforcement. This setting is no 
different than affirmative litigation with regard to the allocation of 
lawyering tasks; if an agency has litigating authority, it has it in both 
enforcement actions and in defensive actions. However, DOJ's gate-
keeping function is quite different. In theory, DO] could refuse to 
defend an agency action; but in practice, such defense is all but 
automatic.38 Not surprisingly, for example, lawyers at EPA generally 
see the Environmental Defense Section as having a stronger sense of 
EPA as a client than do the other sections in the Environment Divi-
sion.39 Similarly, the real-world opportunity for agency lawyers to par-
ticipate in the liti~ation-even, occasionally, presenting or sharing 
the oral argument4 -is greatest in this setting. 
5. Supreme Court Litigation 
Litigation in the Supreme Court is the most highly centralized 
form of government litigation.41 The Solicitor General's Office un-
Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1019 
(2002). 
38 DONALD HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GOVERNMENT LAVNERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 40 (1972) ("[T]he first-instance defense is routinely and sympathetically 
accorded the agencies .... "). See generally id. at 39-44. This is not to say that DOJ will pursue an 
appeal or a petition for certiorari if the initial defense is unsuccessful. That decision is up to 
the Solicitor General, and particularly in the case of petitions for certiorari, involves different 
considerations than the first-instance defense. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.20(a), (b) (2002) (certiorari 
and appeals to appellate courts, respectively). 
39 Interview with Gary .Jonesi, Chief of the Waste Identification and Enforcement Policy 
Branch of the RCRA Enforcement Division of the Office of the Regulatory Enforcement of the 
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, USEPA, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 
1994) [hereinafter .Jonesi Interview). We know of only one case in which DO.J refused to de-
fend an EPA action and EPA went to court with its own lawyers. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Costle, 
631 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The agency won. 
40 See, e.g., Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that EPA 
and DO.J attorneys shared oral argument). 
41 There is now an extensive literature on the Solicitor General's office. See, e.g., LINCOLN 
CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW ( 1987); CHARLES 
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991); 
REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW (1992); Devins, supra 
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dertakes virtually all of it, and most exceptions occur with the Solici-
tor General's approval. With just a couple of exceptions, even agen-
cies that otherwise enjoy litigating authority cannot represent them-
42 
selves before the Court. That means not only that agency lawyers 
are out of the picture altogether or cast in decidedly supporting 
roles, it also means that the work is highly centralized within DOJ. 
6. Counseling 
Although our topic is DOJ control of litigation, the arrangements 
with regard to counseling bear some mention, if only because they 
are in such contrast. Recall that the reformers who created DOJ in 
1870 thought that they were centralizing both litigation and counsel-
ing, and that the two were equally important. 
Just when litigating authority was finally effectively centralized un-
der the control of the Attorney General,'1~ the explosion of regulatory 
statutes and the attendant administrative activity hugely increased the 
role of lawyers in the agencies outside DOJ.44 President Roosevelt's 
executive order, and the later (and current) statutes were silent with 
regard to the counseling function, implicitly endorsing its decentrali-
zation. No pretense of Attorney General control was even made. Ac-
cordingly, it is the agency lawyers, who in total far outnumber the 
DOJ lawyers, who tell officials what they can and cannot do under the 
law. 45 
To be sure, Congress has never repealed the provision, dating 
back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, allowing (but not requiring) agency 
heads to obtain legal advice from the Attorney General.46 And such 
opinions are deemed binding by both DOJ and the agency. But the 
reality is that instances in which DOJ gives an agency a formal opin-
ion number in the dozens per year-a drop in the bucket. More im-
portantly, DOJ cannot insist on giving an opinion on a question of 
note II; John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: '11te Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional 
and Bureaucratic '!1teory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992). One striking aspect of this massive litera-
ture is how much it takes centralization of Supreme Court litigation for granted. 
42 One of us has described and analyzed this arrangement at length, with particular focus on 
the independent agencies. See Devins, supra note II. 
"' See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
44 See generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS ( 1982). 
"' For a more complete description of the nature and role of the agency general counsel, 
see Michael Herz, nw Attorney Particular: Governmental Role of the Agency General Counsel, in 
GOVERNMENTAL LA\\'YERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 143 
(Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995). 
"' For the current version, see 28 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (department head "may require the 
opinion of the Attorney General on questions of law arising in the administration of his de-
partment"). 
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law facing the agency; the agency must come to it.47 As a result, agen-
cies hold their own counsel on the huge maJority of legal issues with-
out any advice or assistance from DO]. Moreover, agency autonomy 
can hardly be said to be threatened by the possibility of an authorita-
tive DOJ opinion. Because the agency itself must initiate the process, 
either the legal issue will be one outside its area of interest and ex-
pertise, or it will perceive some strategic advantage in having DOJ 
d . . ·~ ren er an opmwn. 
B. Federal Lawyering and Its Discontents 
For as long as the current division of responsibility between agen-
cies and DOJ has been in place, it has generated friction and com-
plaints. Writing in the 1930s, Carl Swisher described the 
"[s]ignificant struggles over" centralized control of litigation, the 
"bad grace" with which some agency attorneys "submitted" to DO] 
control and the resulting "strain."•\• In the words of Barbara Babcock, 
former head of DOJ's Civil Division, "[t]he warfare over litigation au-
thority never ends."·"' And as the then-head of EPA's Office of Crimi-
nal Enforcement put it in a letter to the head of the Environment Di-
vision, a "division ... has infused itself between our two agencies" 
characterized by a '"them vs. us' perception that we have long been 
working to overcome.""' Of course, the amount of resentment and 
animosity toward DOJ from agency lawyers ebbs and flows, depend-
ent on particular individuals and their personalities and varying from 
both administration to administration and agency to agency. But the 
issue never disappears. In this article we consider whether, given all 
the smoke, there is actually a fire. 
For agency lawyers, much of the tension results from the personal 
and professional resentment that naturally results from being told to 
step aside by someone with greater power and prestige (who is not 
infrequently younger and less experienced) just when a controversy 
becomes most important and most interesting or, worse, having DOJ 
47 Even in the case of inter<~gency disputes, the relevant Executive Order does not llatly re-
quire submission of the dispute to the Attorney General , it only states that the agencies must go 
to the Auorney General before going to court. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979) , 
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2000). Presumably if they are not planning to go to court, they 
need not go to the Attorney General. 
•• For a discussion of what such advantages might be, see Herz, supra note 45, at 161-62; Nel-
son Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 492-95 (1993) 
(discussing when an agency will seek DOJ advice). 
'" Carl Brent Swishe r, Federal Organization of Legal Functions, 33 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 973, 974, 
986 (1939). 
"' Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 23 .J. 
MARSHALLL. REV. 181, 186 (1990). 
'• ' Letter from Earl E. Devaney, supm note 19, at 420-21 . 
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simply refuse to pursue a case."~ But the tension arises not simply 
from the hierarchy (and its attendant impact on personality), but also 
from a difference in lawyering style''~ and a difference in the missions 
and priorities of DO] and its client agencies. 
The question is whether the frustrations of individuals should be 
ignored, dealt with, or avoided altogether by giving agencies the au-
thority to litigate their own cases."4 And while we would not recali-
brate the current arrangement simply to improve the job satisfaction 
of agency lawyers, the common discontent cannot be dismissed sim-
ply as sour grapes. In the remainder of this paper we discuss more 
substantive concerns about the pros and cons of the current division 
of labor. 
II. jUSTfFICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRALIZATION 
DO]'s status as the government's litigator is justified on the 
grounds that a single, highly talented "law firm" will ensure quality 
representation, consistency, efficiency, and responsiveness to presi-
dential preferences. This argument asserts the absolute necessity that 
the government speak with one voice in the courts, a consistency that 
can be achieved only by centralizing litigation authority. In addition, 
because the Attorney General sees the big picture-and sees it with 
the same eyes as the President-centralization will ensure that repre-
sentation is consistent with the broader policy concerns of the Ad-
ministration. This perspective ensures that parochial agency con-
cerns are not overemphasized at the expense of larger policy 
commitments and that conflicts between agencies are appropriately 
'"
2 See, e.g., Wallace H. Johnson, Our Nation's Energy and Resources-Decision Making in Conflict, 
23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 197, 200 ( 1990) (speaking about former chief of the Lands Division, 
who obsen-ed that "client agency lawyers were often professionally unfulfilled, being limited to 
[m]aking recommendations. Understandably, they wanted the power and opportunity to fol-
low a litigation matter through toiL~ conclusion."); Swisher, supm note 49, at 997-98. On this 
tension, see generally JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD 
CHOICES 7f}-77 ( 1995) (noting destructive "institutional riva!ty" that peaked in the late 1970s 
and mid-to late 1980s, prompting "discord between the agency and its .Justice Department at-
torneys [that] affected enforcement in all environmental media"). Within the Justice Depart-
ment the same dynamic occurs with respect to Supreme Court litigation, when the Solicitor 
General's Office takes over a case that other lawyers within the department. have worked on for 
years. 
''" There are many counterexamples, but as a generalization , agencies seem far more willing 
than DqJ to run the litigation risks. See infm notes 105-106 and accompanying text. Thus, the 
agency and DqJ may be on exactly the same page in terms of their assessment of the likely out-
come of a lawsuit, and Dqj will still refuse to proceed. 
''
4 In exploring this question, we will not examine the political dynamics that help explain 
the allocation of litigation authority, especially Congress' decision to give DOJ a near monopoly 
over executive agency litig-ation. For a general treatment of this subject, see Neal Devins & Mi-
chael Herl, Government Lawyering: 71/.e /Jn.llle thrtl N!roer Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency 
Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTHIP. PROBS. 205 (Winter 1998). 
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resolved. Third, for DO], the expertise of the litigator is litigation; 
DO] lawyers have courtroom skills and familiarity with recurrent non-
agency-specific legal questions that agency lawyers lack. 
In this Part, we examine these familiar justifications for DO] con-
trol of litigation and argue that they are weaker than they first ap-
pear. 
A. Unity and Consistency 
DO] frequently asserts the absolute necessity that the government 
speak with one voice in the courts. This proposition has three sepa-
rate strands: a concern with the uniformity of government positions, 
a desire to avoid open conflicts between parts of the government, and 
a commitment to presidential authority. 
1. Consistency in Litigating Positions 
Supporters of DO] control of litigation emphasize that the federal 
government should espouse consistent, uniform positions in court. It 
should not argue for broad deference to agency interpretation one 
day and against it the next; it should not argue for reliance on legisla-
tive history one day and against it the next; it should not claim the 
Constitution protects the right to abortion one day and deny it the 
next.55 This proposition is usually stated as if it is self-justifying; for 
example, a Deputy Attorney General, arguing against the grant of in-
dependent litigating authority to EPA, wrote: "Only a single, coordi-
nated agency of legal representation can insure that consistent posi-
tions are asserted by the United States when disputes arise regarding 
the proper interpretation of the Constitution, specific statutes, and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence."''" Accepting, for 
the moment, that it is true that consistency can be achieved only 
through "a single, coordinated agency," this argument does not ex-
plain why consistency is so critical. Although consistency is usually 
'''' See, e.g., Mem. from the DqJ, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 21882, 21883 (1972) (stressing 
the "need for uniformity in the litigating positions of the United States"); United States Dep't of 
Justice, Ortice of Legal Counse l, '17!e Attorney General's Role as Chiif Litigator for the United Stales 
(jan. 4, 1982), in 6 Op. Off. Leg. Counsel 47 [herei nafte r OLC Mtc>mo]; Interview with Lois Schif-
fer, Assislalll Auorney General, Environment & Nawral Resources Division , United States Dep't 
of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 13, 1994) (stressing that the government must "speak with 
one voice in court"). 
"" Letter from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Auorney General, to Rep. James Florio (May 4, 
1983), reJJrinted in Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of / 983: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, TmnsfJOrtation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on t.nergy and Commerce, 98th 
Con g. 387, 388 ( 1983). See aL10 UNITED STATES DEI''T OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN 1997-2002 
(1997) ("The Department works to ensure that the Federal Government speaks with one voice 
with respect to law."). 
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invoked as a self-evident imperative, two separate justifications can be 
identified. 
a. Integrity and Strategy 
The first justification is quite abstract: the United States is a single 
entity and as such should not be at odds with itself. This is a comfort-
able and familiar idea. It surfaced, for example, in the Supreme 
Court's opinion in United States v. Providence journal Co.,"1 in which the 
Court refused to allow the Solicitor General to relinquish his role as 
lawyer for the United States even though the governmental interest 
concerned the judicial rather than the executive branch. Reflecting a 
basic assumption about the unity of the federal government, the 
Court rejected as "startling" the suggestion that "there is more than 
one United States' that may appear before this Court."''~ This view of 
the federal government as a single entity is untenable. Certainly, the 
idea of the United States as a single litigant is extraordinarily abstract. 
After all, the government is composed of millions of actual persons 
who are frequently at odds with one another. Its enormous range of 
activities and interests means that there will be conflicts of goals, 
policies, and positions. While this potential for conflict to some ex-
tent sujJports efforts to minimize the inconsistencies, it also belies any 
conception of a unified federal government or even executive 
branch. And, of course, at least over time the government contradicts 
itself constantly, as elected officials change. 
An equally abstract version of this idea is more jurisprudential and 
lies in the intuition that like cases should be treated alike. Ronald 
Dworkin coins the phrase "the virtue of political integrity" to capture 
the idea that the government must "act on a single, coherent set of 
principles.""\) This imperative of integrity-which for Dworkin is 
something distinct from justice, or fairness, or procedural due proc-
ess-"requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a princi-
pled and coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to every-
one the substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for some."1• 1 
It is rather difficult to translate this abstract proposition into a practi-
cal argument about who should control federal litigation. 
The idea of law as integrity is broad enough, and, we will posit, 
important enough, to include concern about how the government 
acts in court. For example, if two individuals are potentially subject 
''' 485 U.S. 693 (1988). 
''" /d . at 701. For a more recent and a more ancient example of Supreme Court hostility to 
placing litigation authority outside of DOJ, see FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 
96 ( 1994); United States v. San .Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 ( 1889). 
''"RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 166 (1986). 
'" /d. at 165. 
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to an enforcement action, there are important equality values in the 
same standards being applied to both, just as such values require the 
same substantive law to be applied to both. Similarly, it is problem-
atic if a given merger will be approved if DOJ reviews it but disap-
proved if the FTC reviews it, and the outcome depends on the hap-
penstance of who's tum it is. 
So the question is not whether government consistency is impor-
tant. The equal protection clause tells us it is. But these interests are 
Jar more importantly at stake with regard to (1) the substantive laws 
laid down and agency interpretations of them,61 (2) the consistency of 
individual agencies when confronted with recurrent sorts of cases, 
and (3) the millions of daily discretionary decisions made by agency 
officers, prosecutors, and law enforcers. The subtle differences in 
consistency in courtroom positions that would flow from having DOJ 
or agency lawyers represent agencies in court are about the last place 
one would look to ensure respect for the law as integrity principle. 
The key point is that litigation occurs ex post, efforts to ensure overall 
62 governmental consistency are best made ex ante. 
The second idea behind the proposition that the government 
should not contradict itself in court is, in contrast, intensely practical. 
Inconsistency makes the government a less effective litigant.6· Former 
D.C. Circuitjudge Patricia Wald has commented on the consistency 
of governmental positions taken in court, which she describes as "one 
of the most vexing aspects of the relationship between judges and 
government lawyers."M She makes clear that inconsistent stances by 
the government are, at best, poor strategy: they make judges "wary," if 
not "outraged"; they are "irritating," for, in her view, 'judges do have, 
and should have, a right to expect consistency in the positions the 
government takes in different aspects of the same underlying case," 
or in similar cases.6" Inconsistency will not only annoy judges, it will 
61 But see H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 336 (1977) (explaining proposed provision that would 
have given the EPA independent litigating authority under the Clean Air Act and rejecting 
need for government-wide consistent policy on highly technical and specific questions that arise 
under particular statutes). 
62 On executive control of the regulatory bureaucracy, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Admini-
stration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Richard H. Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regu-
latrny State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1995). 
"' This is one of several ways in which centralization might improve the government's suc-
cess in court; others include the development of litigation expertise in individual attorneys, the 
ability to draw highly capable attorneys because of the promise of interesting work and the at-
tendant prestige, and the development of a strong rapport with federal judges. These are dis-
cussed below. 
114 Patricia M. Wald, "For the United States": Government Lawyers in Court, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107, 122 (Winter 1998). 
"'' !d. at 123-24 ("A private lawyer sometimes argues one meaning of a precedent one day 
and another meaning in a different case another day, but we would be outraged if the govern-
ment did the same. "). 
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eliminate the othenvise natural tendency to defer to the govern-
ment's presumably well-thought-out position.';t; Both in her direct 
admonitions, and indirectly through the evident importance that she 
attaches to the matter and her somewhat testy tone, Judge Wald 
makes clear that simply as a matter of liti~ating strategy it is a bad 
idea for the government to contradict itself. ' 
Third, and again distinct, is the possibility that today's happy liti-
gation triumph for Agency A will be tomorrow's disastrous precedent 
for Agency B. Handicapped by its narrow, parochial perspective, a 
particular agency may pursue its agenda in ways that are harmful in 
the long term to other parts of the government. In theory, the De-
partment of Justice is in a better position to avoid having the gov-
ernment shoot itself in the foot and harm its long-term interests; be-
cause it has multiple agency clients, it will have some sense of these 
risks.'iH 
b. How Much of a Rish, and How to Control? 
For the foregoing reasons, inconsistency in litigating positions is a 
legitimate concern, though hardly profoundly troubling. There re-
mains the additional question of whether eliminating DOJ control 
would lead to significant inconsistencies. We know of no real evi-
dence that the instances in which agencies have been given inde-
pendent litigating authority have led to intolerable inconsistencies. 
With regard to "the government's" positions under specific statutes, 
the risk of greater inconsistency is nil. Indeed, if agencies have liti-
gating authority, consistency under specific statutes or within specific 
programs is likely to increase, if anything, because the litigating posi-
tion will be the agency's alone, without mediation or massaging by 
DO]. 
"; /d. at 127 ("In these cases [i .e., where sepa rate gove rnmental attorneys take conflicting 
positions in the same case], the court fee ls more at liberty to decide on its own where right and 
justice lie. Defe rence is diffused .... '"). 
"' To the same etlect, the Supreme Court concluded in N~Cv. NRA: 
But the practice also serves the Gove rnment well; an individual Government agency nee· 
essarily has a more parochial view of the inte rest of the Government in litigation than 
does the Solicitor Ge neral's office , with its broader view of litig-.ttion in which the Gov-
ernment is involved throughout the state and fe deral court systems. Whether review of a 
decision adve rse 1.0 the Government in a court of appeals should be sought depends on a 
number of factors which do not lend themse lves to easy categorization . The Govern· 
ment as a whole is apt to fare better if these decisions are concentr.tted in a single offi-
cial. 
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994) . 
'"' See, e.g. , Michael Davidson , Claims Involving Frmul: Contracting Offiur Limitations During Pro-
cunmumt Fraud Investigations, 2002 ARMY l.J\W. 21, 29 ("A centralized authority is necessary to de· 
termine if fraud exist~; otherwise subsequent litigation may be handicapped by diffe rent agen-
cies taking inconsistent positions on the same alleged misconduct.") . 
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With regard to overarching legal questions, consistency often will 
also take care of itself, because the government position is apparent 
and would be adopted by any government attorney. The most obvi-
ous examples are administrative law doctrines such as judicial defer-
ence to agency interpretations or the hard look doctrine; any gov-
ernment lawyer, from DOJ or the agency, will argue for deferential 
review. Other settings-the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), for 
example-will have some variance but are still likely to produce gen-
erally consistent positions. 
Another area where there might be inconsistency is in the reli-
ance on "technical" defenses, especially jurisdictional arguments. 
Agencies interested in a ruling on the merits will not raise technical 
defenses; agencies interested in avoiding such a ruling will raise juris-
dictional arguments. This type of inconsistency, however, can be tol-
erated. The failure to raise a technical defense, for the most part, 
means either that the issue will not be adjudicated or that the court 
will raise the issue on its own. In the first category, there will be no 
conflict-because the agency failing to raise the defense did not as-
sert an inconsistent legal position with the agency that did assert the 
defense. In the second instance, the court may well resolve the issue 
on its own initiative (so that an agency's legal argument is not espe-
cially relevant to the court's decision). Of course, there will be in-
stances where agencies make inconsistent arguments. But even here 
courts will often look to precedent outside the context of government 
litigation-so ~at the arguments of a~qency attorneys are somewhat 
less consequential here than elsewhere. · 
Perhaps the risk of inconsistent governmental litigating positions 
is highest with regard to methodological questions. There is no sys-
temic or a priari reason that it should be in the government's interest 
always to be a textualist or always to look at legislative history; always 
to read remedial statutes broadly or to read them narrowly; or for ap-
pellate courts always to review certain issues de novo or always defer 
to the trial court. However, even here we would not be too con-
cerned if EPA in one case relied on legislative history and the De-
partment of Health and Human Services in another urged the court 
to ignore it. First, such a methodological issue raises the underlying 
concerns of integrity and strategy in quite dilute form. Second, some 
such inconsistency already occurs with DOJ handling litigation. In-
69 One possible exception is intra-governmental litigation . In a centralized system, these 
cases may never be brought in the first instance, if only because DOJ will not represent oppos-
ing parties. In a decentralized system, enforcement agencies might well bring lawsuits against 
other parts of the government; for example, the EPA might sue the Army Corps or Department 
of Energy for violating environmental regulations. We return to this point in at Part 
ll(A)(I)(c) below. 
HeinOnline -- 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L.  576 2002 - 2003
576 JOURNAL OF CONS71TU710NAL LAW [Vol. 5:3 
deed, it should occur: such inconsistency is the necessary outcome of 
good advocacy, which is always in part situational and takes advantage 
of what is at hand.70 Third, such variations will occur to an even 
greater degree, notwithstanding centralized litigation authority, over 
time. While inconsistencies separated in time are less ~roblematic 
than simultaneous ones, they still do raise some concerns. ' 
In addition, the agency officials who would ultimately control the 
agency's actions, policy, and basic litigating decisions are part of the 
same administration, and appointed by the same president, as the At-
torney General. Like-mindedness does not guarantee consistency, 
but it does at least promote it. Thus, allowing agency litigating au-
thority would not result in chaos and contradiction; the room for 
variation is fairly constrained; agencies are still part of the administra-
tion and will still want the government to win. 
Lastly, the question is not simply whether decentralization would 
produce inconsistencies, but rather how much more inconsistency 
would result. DOJ is a vast and sprawling entity. It cannot perfectly 
coordinate its own activities.72 The Department is itself not altogether 
centralized; significant independent authority is delegated to the U.S. 
Attorney's Offices. Nor is it so intimately familiar with the details of 
each agency's program to be able to anticipate whether a particular 
outcome in one agency's lawsuit will come back to haunt other agen-
cies (a task that can be hard enough for a single entity). We would 
not claim that there will be no loss of consistency from decentraliza-
tion; of course there would be. We only suggest that it would not be 
so great as might first appear. 
Finally, accepting that there would be a greater risk of the gov-
ernment speaking out of both sides of its mouth were litigating au-
thority decentralized, it is not necessary for DOJ to handle all litiga-
tion itself to prevent, or at least significantly reduce, such 
occurrences. For example, DOJ could issue general guidance or in-
struction; it could review filings prepared by agency attorneys, much 
the way the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews 
agency testimony;7g it could conduct training sessions for agency at-
70 Hence, the old piece of lawyer's advice: if the law is against you, pound on the facts; if the 
facts are against you, pound on the law; if both the law and the facts are ag-<~inst you, pound on 
the table. 
71 Cf Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting that an agency interpreta-
tion consistently held over time merits heightened deference). 
72 See, e.g., Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: 71te Debate Over Federal Litigating Author-
ity, 68 JUDICATURE 71, 81 (1984) (noting that several persons have pointed out that DOJ cannot 
effectively coordinate the activities of United States Attorneys). 
7
" See United States Office of Management and Budget, Legislative Coordination 
and Clearance, Circular A-19, § 7 (rev'd Sept. 19, 1979), available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov 
/omb/circulars/a019/a019.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003). 
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torners; and the Solicitor General could continue to authorize ap-
peals. 4 
c. Interagency Litigation 
The starkest example of the government taking inconsistent posi-
tions in court occurs when two parts of the government are on oppo-
site sides of the same lawsuit. This happens more than rarely at pre-
sent-sufficiently often that, to quote Judge Wald, federal judges 
have become "inured" to such cases.75 However, it does not happen 
unless one agency is able to represent itself; DOJ will not bring an ac-
tion in which its attorneys appear on both sides. Were more agencies 
able to do so, it is almost certain that the number of instances would 
increase, a prospect that, depending on one's point of view, may be 
embatTassing, unseemly, inappropriate, or unconstitutional.76 
This is not the place to enter into this debate about the legitimacy 
or constitutionality of intragovernmental litigation. 77 Suffice it to say 
that if interagency litigation is in some circumstances inappropriate 
or even unconstitutional, the way to prevent is for the courts to hold 
it nonjusticiable, or for the President to use his constitutional author-
ity to keep it from occurring, or for Congress to proscribe it in whole 
or in part. Relying on the allocation of litigating authority to keep it 
from happening is the tail wagging the dog. Additionally, if inter-
agency litigation is not inappropriate or unconstitutional, then the 
fact that it does not occur because of centralized litigating authority is 
a cost of the current regime, not a benefit. 
2. Respect for Presidential Prerogatives 
Closely related to the "one voice" principle is a concern about au-
thority. If the government speaks with two contradictory voices, one 
of those (at a minimum) will not be the President's. If the executive 
branch is unitary and must reflect the President's views and policies-
views and policies for which the President will be held electorally ac-
" By regulation, the Solicitor General is responsible for "[d]etermining whether, and to 
what extent, appeals will be taken by the Government to all appellate courts." 28 C.F.R. 
§ 0.20(b) (2002) . Whe the r the Solicitor General should maintain this authority seems to us a 
distinct, though related, question from whether DOJ should handle all government litigation. 
"' SeeWald, supm note 64, at127. 
76 See Griffin B. Bell , The Attarney General: 111e federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litiga-
tor, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1978). 
77 On intragovernmentallitigation in general, see Michael Herz, United States v. United States: 
When Can the Federal Government Sue ltselfl, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 990 (1991) (concluding 
that interagency enforcement actions are justiciable but regulatory disputes are not). For a re-
cent judicial rejection of the argument, made on EPA's behalf by DOJ, that intrabranch litiga-
tion is nonjusticiable , see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184, 1193-98 (II th Cir. 2002) . 
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countable-then the system has broken down if parts of the branch 
take inconsistent positions in court. This is the heart of OLC's de-
fense of centralized litigation authority: 
[I] t is essential that the Attorney General not relinquish his supervisory 
authority over the agency's litigation functions, for the Attorney General 
alone is obligated to represent the broader interests of the Executive. It 
is this responsibility to ensure that the interests of the United States as a 
whole, as articulated by the Executive, are given a paramount position 
over potentially conflicting interests between subordinate segments of 
the government of the United States which uniquely justifies the role of 
the Attorney General as the chief litigator for the United States. Only the 
Attorney General has the overall perspective to perform this function. 7H 
On this account, an important aspect of DOJ's role is to rein in 
~v.erz~alo~s or tu~mel-visi~:med agency .at.tom~ys, ,ensuring th~t a!S~ncx 
litigatiOn IS consistent With the AdmmistratiOn s overall pnontles. · 
These concerns with presidential prerogatives are relevant and im-
portant, but, we conclude, badly overstated. 
a. Distinguishing Law and Policy 
This argument rests on a rather "non-lawyerly" understanding of 
DOJ's role. It treats litigation decisions as policy decisions; the Attor-
ney General is, on this account, not interpreting legal requirements 
and making legal arguments, but pursuing policy objectives. We 
would readily grant that the President has important authority over 
executive department policymaking (notwithstanding our skepticism 
over the strong version of the unitary executive theory). But actual 
policymaking authority in any given area belongs to the agency, not 
DO]. Giving DOJ control of federal litigation is certainly an inade-
quate, arguably an irrelevant, and possibly a perverse way of achieving 
presidential control of agency policymaking. The White House has 
far better and ultimately more effective means for doing so, including 
appointing like-minded officials, jawboning, the threat of removal, 
and OMB review. 
It may also be that the White House wants government agencies to 
advance conflicting legal arguments in court. The political interests 
of the President, for example, might be served by having the EPA and 
Department of Energy advance conflicting arguments on the appro-
priate scope of environmental enforcement. That way the President 
can simultaneously embrace environmental and industry interests 
(or, at least, can avoid choosing one set of interests ahead of the 
'" OLC Memo, supra note 55, at 54. 
79 InteiView with Roger Clegg, General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, former 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights and Environment Divisions, United States Dep't 
of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Clegg InteiView ]. 
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other). Another example of this phenomena occurs within DOJ-the 
Civil Division regularly defends employment discrimination lawsuits 
and has incentive to take a pro-defendant position; the Civil Rights 
Division files employment discrimination cases and has incentive to 
advance a pro-plaintiff understanding of antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. Again, rather than pick sides, the President may prefer to let 
courts resolve these conflicts. Consider, for example, Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC),80 in which the 
Supreme Court upheld FCC preferences for minority broadcasters. 
The (first) George Bush's DOJ was beholden to social conservatives 
and had a general anti-affirmative action position. At the time of 
Metro Broadcasting, however, Bush FCC nominees needed to convince 
Congress that they would defend race preferences and, in so doing, 
disavowed Reagan FCC efforts to undo this affinnative action pro-
gram.81 The solution was for Solicitor General Kenneth Starr to allow 
the FCC to represent itself in defending the program, while Starr 
filed an amicus brief arguing that the program was unconstitutional. 
And while proponents of a unitary executive may have disapproved of 
these dual filings, it is noteworthy that the Bush White House em-
braced this practice. 
As was true in Metro Broadcasting, lawyers in DOJ might best serve 
their President by advancing and defending the policy decisions that 
result under the system rather than second-guessing them. Indeed, 
in its insistence to the contrary, DOJ reflects something of the tunnel 
vision and lack of "overall perspective" that it attributes to the agen-
cies. It is pre-occupied with litigation, as if all that an agency does is 
go to court and so the key mechanism for controlling wayward agen-
cies is control of litigation.8~ 
b. Who is the Government Lali.!Jer's Client? 
The basic arrangement might be justified by analogy to the private 
sector. Corporations have in-house lawyers who are responsible for 
"" Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
81 See Devins, supra note 11; Neal E. Devins, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Req-
uiemfm·a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 138-41 ( 1990). 
"
2 Reconciling "potentially conflicting interesL~" is not something one generally thinks of a 
lawyer as doing. To the contrary, when multiple clients have one lawyer but contlicting inter-
ests, the usual response is that they should go out and find new lawyers. Thus, where DOJ as-
serts the need to reconcile different agency positions and ensure intra-executive uniformity, the 
agencies see only a conflict of interest. These may be indirect, as where DOJ takes a position on 
behalf of one agency that is in the abstract in tension with another's agenda or goals (e.g., argu-
ing that federal facilities are immune from state environmental regulation, when EPA sees them 
as under-regulated polluters), or quite direct, as when DOJ refused to allow EPA to submit an 
amicus brief in United States v: SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 ( 1973). See genemlly H. R. REP. No. 95-294, at 
334 (1977). 
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counseling (like the agency general counsel) and handle minor liti-
gation where the stakes are not too high (like agency lawyers han-
dling administrative enforcement cases). When the stakes rise or the 
corporation is in serious trouble, it is more likely to turn to outside 
counsel. For example, an outside firm will handle major litigation or 
render an especially important legal opinion, just as agencies rely on 
DOJ for representation in the courtroom or may turn to the Office of 
Legal Counsel to resolve the occasional thorny legal problem.83 
This easy analogy cannot itself justify DOJ control of litigation, 
however, because the structure of the DOJ/agency relationship in 
fact does not tidily track the attorney I client relationship in the pri-
vate sector.84 First and foremost, the agency is a captive client; it can-
not choose to use its own lawyers or retain a different "firm." One 
would expect that as a result DOJ would be less solicitous toward the 
agency than is the normal private attorney toward her client.8" Cer-
tainly agencies lack the prerogatives enjoyed by private clients. Most 
obviously, basic decisions about the litigation, such as whether to file 
suit or whether to appeal a loss, lie with DOJ, not the client agency. 
And while there is significant variation from case to case, agency to 
agency, and administration to administration, decisions about litiga-
tion strategy as to which a private sector client makes the ultimate call 
(although it will in practice defer to the lawyer's advice), lie with DOJ 
in federal agency litigation. Is it appropriate, then, to label a federal 
agency DOJ's "client?"8fi 
"" Lois Schiffer, who later became head of DOJ's Environment Division, has invoked this 
analogy in defending centrJ.lized litigation authority. See Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual 
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 187 (1979) (transcript of 
comment of Lois Schiffer) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Conference]. 
84 For a well-reasoned rejection of the reflexive application of the private lawyering model to 
the governmental context in a related setting, see Melanie Leslie, Government Officials as Attor-
neys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 IND. LJ. 469 (2002) (arguing that only a limited 
attorney-client privilege, at most, should apply to communications between government officials 
and government attorneys). 
"'' See D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 83, at 168 (statement of Richard M. Cooper, General 
Counsel of the Food and Drug Administration) ("The Department ... is in a monopoly posi-
tion; it has no competition, and its performance is not subject to the discipline of attracting, 
retaining or losing clients."); Clegg interview, supra note 79 (stressing that private attor-
ney/client model is inapt because DOJ does not need EPA's business and EPA has no place else 
to go anyway). Of course, while the agency cannot pick or change its lawyers, neither need it 
pay for their services. This, too, must result in a different dynamic than in the private setting. 
One former Justice Department official commented that precisely because the agency does not 
have to pay for DOJ's services, it "is not subject to the discipline that fee-paying imposes" and 
therefore has no incentive to minimize the burdens on its lawyers. D. C. Circuit Conference, supra 
note 83. 
"'; There is something of a cottage industry in putting together lists of possible persons or 
entities that might be said to be the "client" of the government lawyer. Roger Cramton identi-
ties five: "[I] the public, [2] the government as a whole, [3] the branch of government in which 
the lawyer is employed, [ 4] the particular agency or department in which the lawyer works, and 
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DOJ's stance has generally been one of grudging acknowledgment 
that the agencies have the primary policymaking responsibilities.87 
But it has often been wary about accepting the "client" label for the 
agencies it represents, presumably out of a reluctance to endorse the 
deference and zealous advocacy owed to clients.88 Mter all, DOJ may 
have other clients, most notably, the White House. Drawing from the 
Reagan and (first) Bush Administrations' emphasis on the unitary 
executive, this view of the agency /DOJ relationship is one of col-
leagues within the executive branch, both subordinate to the Presi-
dent's authority and policy vision, with DOJ perhaps prima inter pares. 
This version of the relationship rests on the need for consistency, co-
ordinated legal policymaking, and the ultimate loyalty of all parts of 
the executive branch to their shared boss.8!' 
[5] the responsible officers who make decisions for the agency." Roger C. Cramton, 77le Lawyer 
as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 ( 1991). 
For the DOJ lawyer, the situation is further complicated by working in one department and rep-
resenting another; so the last two items on Cramton's list might be DOJ and the Attorney Gen-
eral, or they might be the Department and Secretary of, say, Agriculture. See James R. Har>'ey, 
III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 
WM.&MARYL.REV.I569,157l (1996). 
"' See Discussion, In 71w Hotseat at justice, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 40, 45 (comment of 
Richard B. Stewart) ("EPA or the agency is the client, and the client is going to make the fun-
damental policy decisions . . . . In the end, you have to follow what the client says, even if the 
client is wrong."); Bell, supra note 76, at 1061 (noting DO.J's obligation to accede to "the policy 
prerogatives of our agency clients"); Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What 
Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 279 (1993); Olson, supra 
note 72, at 82 (describing DOJ's ofticial position as being "that the Department does not make 
policy-that is the responsibility and the right of the client agencies"). 
88 Among the clearest examples of this reluctance can be found in the much-cited OLC 
Memorandum concerning the Attorney General's control over federal litigation. There, Assis-
tant Attorney General Theodore Olson carefully put quotation marks around every reference to 
the Department's "client agencies." For·example: 
[T]he Attorney General is better able to coordinate the legal involvements of each "cli-
ent" agency with those of other "client" agencies, as well as with the broader legal inter-
ests of the United States overall. Yet, while the "client" agencies may be involved, to vary-
ing degrees, in carrying out the litigation responsibilities necessary to assist the Attorney 
General in representing the agency's particular interests, it is essential that the Attorney 
General not relinquish his supervisory authority over the agency's litigation functions, for 
the Attorney General alone is obligated to represent the broader interests of the Execu-
tive. 
OLC Memo, supra note 55, at 54; see also id. at 62; D. C. Circuit Conference, sujmt note 83, at 173 
{statement of Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General): 
There's too much talk in the Department of Justice, mostly started by me, l suppose in 
an effort to maintain our position, of talking about our client-agencies, and in the sense 
they are our client-agencies, but we in the Department must recognize that, at all times, 
that the people of the United States are our clients, and I think it's quite different, the 
relationship we have and the responsibilities that we have to the people of the United 
States than the responsibilities that we have to the particular agencies making up the Ex-
ecutive Branch of the United States Government. 
"" See Bmce E. Fein, Promoting the President's Policies 17zrough Legal Advocacy: An Ethical hnfJera-
tive of the Government Attorney, 30 FED. B.J. 406, 406 (1983) (arguing that the client of the gov-
ernment attorney is the President, and that the attorney has an ethical obligation to emphati-
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This model assumes a greater policymaking role for DO]. If the 
only way for DO] to achieve its policies is to aggravate EPA, then it 
will aggravate EPA.!10 One might distinguish between different sorts 
of policies that DOJ might seek to further. First, DOJ might pursue 
legal or judicial policies such as judicial restraint, a particular concep-
tion of how to read statutes, sovereign immunity, or federalism. 
These broad legal issues cut across agencies and have important pol-
icy consequences outside the courtroom; they are central to the judi-
cial system and therefore closest to DOJ's ostensible area of expertise 
and authority and of greatest consequence beyond the "parochial" 
concerns of a particular agency. A second category might consist of 
the administration's general policies with regard to government regu-
lation-for or against free markets, risk assessment, cost/benefit 
analysis, etc. These too involve multiple agencies, but involve less law 
and more policy. Finally, DOJ might have policy views on particular 
substantive issues as to which Congress and the President have dele-
gated policymaking authority to a particular agency. The executive 
hierarchy model is least compelling with regard to this last set of is-
sues. 
Agencies, of course, would reject the executive hierarchy model in 
favor of the private attorney/client model, with its notions of defer-
ence to client wishes and zealous advocacy. As one EPA attorney ex-
pressed in an interview, his main complaint about his counterparts at 
DO] is that "they do not recognize or appreciate the lawyer/client re-
lationship. The agency is supposed to be the client."91 This model 
begins with the undeniable premise that Congress has delegated en-
vironmental policymaking authority to EPA, not DOJ. The agency 
writes the regulations. The agency determines overall enforcement 
cally serve the President through legal advocacy, providing "unremitting assistance through 
[any non-frivolous]legal argument to the incumbent Administration in furtherance of the poli-
cies championed by the President"); McGinnis, supra note 41 (arguing that the Solicitor Gen-
eral's only client is the President and that the Solicitor General has a constitutional obligation 
to advance the President's interpretation of the Constitution and the laws made under it); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1293 ( 1987) (arguing that government attorneys' representative obligations run not to particu-
lar agencies but to the executive branch as a whole and to the President in particular). 
!Kl As the OLC 1nen1o concludes: 
[S]ituations may arise where the Attorney General is faced with conflicting demands, e.g., 
where a "client" agency desires to circumvent the law, or dissociate itself from legal or 
policy judgments to which the Executive subscribes; where a "client" agency attempts to 
litigate against another agency or department of the federal government; or where a "cli-
ent" agency desires a legal result that will benefit the narrow area of law administered by 
the agency, without regard to the broader interests of the United States government as a 
whole. In such cases, the Attorney General's obligation to represent and advocate the 
"client" agency's position must yield to a higher obligation to take care that the laws be 
executed faithfully. 
OLC Memo, supra note 55, at 62. See also Clegg interview, supra note 79. 
91 Jonesi Interview, supra note 39. 
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prionties. DOJ assists and facilitates, it does not dictate. The justifi-
cation for DO] involvement in EPA's litigation is essentially one of 
expertise. Like the litigators in an outside firm, the DOJ lawyers have 
a particular set of skills that can be used to the agency's benefit.92 On 
this account, the agency would be very much DOJ's client. DOJ's task 
would be to do its best to implement the policy desires of the agency. 
It should inform the agency of its assessment of litigation risks, defer-
ring to the agency's judgment as to whether to run those risks, and in 
general doing its best to assist the agency in getting where the agency 
wants to go. Such a model has at times had support within DOJ as 
well.93 
This ties in with a much larger debate that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For present purposes, we would make three brief points. 
First, the question of independent litigation authority is part of the 
unitary executive debate; unitary executive enthusiasts should prefer 
centralization, unitary executive skeptics should be more open to de-
centralization. Second, it is only a small part of that debate. Decen-
tralization of litigating authority would not unmake the unitary ex-
ecutive. As noted above, the president has many additional, and 
more important, mechanisms of control. Third, in some circum-
stances the president may prefer some variation or competing inter-
pretations within the executive branch. 
B. The Nature and Quality of Government Lawyering 
The second general set of issues about DOJ control of federal liti-
gation concerns the nature and quality of the lawyering that results. 
In this Section, we consider the practical consequences, benefits, and 
drawbacks of centralization. 
1. Inherent versus Acquired Characteristics of DO] and Agency Lawyers 
Arguments for DO] representation must be evaluated in light of 
whether they reflect what might be termed "inherent" or "acquired" 
differences between the DO] and its client agencies. For example, it 
is sometimes suggested that agencies must rely on DOJ for represen-
"' Cf Devins, supra note 11, at 304 (noting benefits of Solicitor General's representation of 
independent agencies because "Solicitor General lawyers are extraordinarily able and skilled at 
Supreme Court advocacy"). 
"" See, e.g., Bell, supra note 76, at 1061 (noting his efforts to ensure that the White House did 
not "interfere with the policy prerogatives of our agency clients") ; Wade H. McRee, Jr. , The So-
licitor General and His Client, 50 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 345, 346 (1981) (stating that it is "essential" 
for the Solicitor General "to avoid any appearance of formulating ' policy' for the agencies" and 
that when the Solicitor General and an agency disagree on a legal issue, the Solicitor General 
should either present or allow the agency to present the latter's views where "well-grounded 
differences of opinion exist"). 
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tation because they lack the manpower to take on litigation responsi-
bilities on top of their existing counseling and administrative en-
forcement functions. This is no doubt true, but irrelevant for our 
purposes. Were agency legal staffs to take on more responsibility, 
they would need, and could get, more staffing. By the same token, at 
certain points, DOJ has simply lacked the resources to handle all 
agency referrals, leading to significant delays and justified impatience 
on the part of particular agencies.!'4 .B.ut ~~tis .a budgeta~ eroblem 
and cannot be a reason for decentrahzmg httgatmg authonty: 
Other standard arguments for DO] control involve more complex 
combinations of acquired and inherent characteristics. For example, 
it is often said that DOJ is a more prestigious position that does more 
interesting work and therefore attracts and can pick from a more tal-
ented applicant pool. Since it has better lawyers, it should handle the 
high-stakes, difficult work of litigation. This is a wholly circular or 
self-fulfilling argument for DO] litigating authority. If, say, EPA rep-
resented itself in court, then all the hot-shots now hoping to work in 
the Environment Division would be applying to EPA, because that is 
where the exciting, high-stakes, prestigious work would be.!16 Simi-
larly, DOJ attorneys have the benefit of the Department's own highly 
successful trial advocacy training program. Yet there is no reason 
"
4 The mid-1970s were such a period. See PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE 
PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 259 n.l4 ( 1991) (referring to a 1976 EPA Region II 
memor,mdum complaining that refermls "languish(ed) for over nine months without ever be-
ing filed"). As were the mid- to late-1980s. See MINTZ, supm note 52, at 77. Mintz quotes one 
regional EPA attorney, speaking in 1991, as follows: 
Frankly, (the Department of] .Justice is swamped. They're working as hard as they possi-
bly can, but they just don't have the people to do all the work that has to be done. There 
is a problem just moving paper through DO.J. It's not unusual for it to take six months 
for a Consent Decree that's been negotiated and signed by the defendants to be entered. 
Things are really slowing down. They're good attorneys. I have a lot of respect for them. 
!just wish there were more people there. 
/d. (quoting T. Leverett Nelson, Section Chief, Solid Waste and Emergency Response Branch, 
Oflice of Regional Counsel, EPA Region V). See also Interview with Walter Mugdan, Deputy Re-
gional Counsel, USEPA, Region II, in New York, NY (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Mugdan Inter-
view] (noting that DOJ was overburdened in the mid-1980s). 
"'' With two caveaL~. First, if there was some reason why one would expect understaffing and 
inadequate resources at one agency mther than the other, that would be a reason for allocating 
more tasks to the inherently better-staffed agency. We perceive no such tendency here, how-
ever. Second, to the extent the problem is one of inadequate overall resources, this is a reason 
for streamlining the process. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text. 
"" This may not be true of every agency. Horowitz argues that "some agencies simply will not 
enhance their recruitment capacity significantly if they have litigation authority." HOROWITZ, 
supra note 38, at 132. See also D.C. Circuit Conference, supm note 83, at 175 (statement of Associ-
ate Attorney General Michael Egan) (claiming that OOJ "ideally should have the best litigators 
there are in the United States, and to the extent that we stan d[ifl]using among agencies, litiga-
tion expertise, the whole thing will go down"). Moreover, when it comes to Supreme Court 
litigation, it probably is true that the Solicitor General can attmct better lawyers than could any 
individual agency, even one that handled its own Supreme Court litigation. 
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that, or a similar program, could not be provided to federal litigators 
outside the Department. Indeed DOJ's Office of Legal Education 
currently offers a course on Advocacy Skills for agency lawyers, 
'17 
among many other courses.· 
Likewise, although it is certainly true that DOJ lawyers have court-
room expertise and familiarity with recurrent non-agency-specific le-
gal questions that agency lawyers lack, it is far from clear whether the 
agency benefits from having experienced generalist litigators repre-
senting it. On the one hand, the generalist's merely passing familiar-
ity with the relevant legal regime can be an advantage, since the judi-
cial audience that must be convinced also consists of generalists. 
Moreover, DOJ lawyers are aware of trends within the judiciary and 
know the tendencies of particular judges.9H On the other hand, if 
agencies represented themselves, they would develop the courtroom 
expertise DOJ attorneys now boast. Furthermore, DOJ attorneys' 
generalist courtroom skills are not the only relevant skills. From the 
agency's point of view, it has the edge in expertise, because, particu-
larly in a complex and technical field, what is really necessary is an in-
depth understanding of the particular substantive area.!'!' 
Another example: Since DOJ sometimes turns down agency refer-
rals, agencies, almost by definition, have looser standards for refer-
ring a case than DOJ has for bringing it. To DOJ, this divergence 
demonstrates that it must supervise and control agency litigation. Yet 
here again, DOJ checking functions results at least in part from the 
97 Seewww.usdoj.gov:SO/usao/eousa/ole/descript.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2003). 
98 HOROWJTZ, supra note 38, at 130. 
"'' It is a longstanding and predictable complaint of agency lawyers that DOJ simply lacks 
sufficient knowledge of the particulars of agency programs and the underlying statutes to de-
fend them adequately in court. The following statement of FDA General Counsel Richard 
Cooper is typical: 
[A]n agency lawyer who has worked on a regulation since its inception or has worked on 
a program for a number of years simply knows more about it and knows more about the 
needs that gave rise to it, the policies that it reflects, and the practical problems that arise 
in its implementation, than does his counterpart in the Department of Justice . Because 
successful advocacy in a regulatory case depends very much on presenting to the court 
the practical reasons for the regulation or decision, and a thorough understanding of 
the real world context that it addresses, the lawyers for the agency, I would argue, have a 
significant advantage over the lawyers from the Department of justice. 
D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 83, at 172 (statement of Richard Cooper). Thus, one reads 
the following in the FDA's current regulatory procedures manual with regard to the prepara· 
tion of referral packages for DOJ: 
To forestall a potential negative impression about the case by AUSAs who are often un· 
aware of the very strong case law in support of ir~unctions under the Act, the cover letter 
will also contain standard legal paragraphs. One paragraph will explain, with case cita· 
tions, the special rules that apply to statutory ir~unctions under the Act; for example, t.he 
fact the irreparable harm need not be shown. The other standard paragraph, where ap-
propriate, will contain a brief legal discussion of the law with respect to the violation at 
issue. 
U.S. FDA, supra note 22 (citations omitted). 
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current allocation of tasks, not from inherent characteristics of DO] 
and the agency. Precisely because agencies lack litigation authority, 
their effectiveness is judged, by congressional overseers for example, 
by the number of cases they refer to DOJ. 100 Consequently, rather 
than screen out weak cases, agencies have strong incentives to make 
use of looser standards than DOJ whose effectiveness is measured by 
how well it does in court. If agencies represented themselves, and 
therefore could not rely on DO] to say no, insist on fuller referral 
packages, or tighten up a proposed complaint, then they would be-
have more like DO]. To our knowledge agencies with litigating au-
thority are not bringing carelessly prepared, inappropriate cases; to 
the contrary, they have developed their own internal review mecha-
• 101 
msms. 
To be sure, we must to some extent take the world as we find it. 
In a sense, all characteristics of an agency are "acquired" rather than 
"inherent," because the agency is an artificial creation that can be 
eliminated or remade. The Department of Justice will not disappear. 
Its litigating responsibilities across the government are not going to 
be handed over to all the client agencies in one fell swoop. Our 
point is only that we are skeptical about claims for DOJ control that 
are selfjustifying, relying on characteristics that are themselves the 
product of the current allocation of authority to justifY that allocation. 
2. Gatekeeping 
DO] centralization is sometimes seen as a necessary check on 
unthought-through litigation. At first blush, this argument seems 
sensible. Specifically, while there is no control group (so it is impos-
sible to know what would have happened in unlitigated cases), the 
agency undoubtedly would have lost some-perhaps even many-of the 
cases DO] refuses to bring, and thus is benefited rather than harmed 
by DO]'s restraint. Not all the declined cases should be brought. At 
the same time, for reasons already detailed, not all the declined cases 
would be brought if agencies controlled their own litigation. If an 
agency represented itself, for example, it would need to develop its 
own screening process. In some measure, this system would replicate 
the current regime except it would exist within the single agency. 
Consider, for example, the Department of Labor, an agency with un-
'()(' At the EPA, for example, the pressure to refer cases is sufficiently strong that referrals 
have been known to skyrocket at the end of the Fiscal Year in order to pad statistics. See Kevin 
Gaynor, Too Many Cooks ... , 6 EN\'[L. F. 9, 10 Oan.-Feb. 1989) ("In the fourth quarter of every 
fiscal year, the DqJ is deluged with referrals as each [EPA] region tries to meet its referral 
goals."). See also Clegg Interview, supra note 79 (referring to this end of the year phenomenon 
as "the lump in the snake") . 
"" See sujJm notes 27-30 and accompanying text and infra note I 02. 
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qualified litigating authority under various statutes. The Department 
makes use of a screening process to sort out whether to appeal trial 
court defeats-a process that has created tensions between trial at-
torneys who want to appeal any and all defeats and appellate attor-
neys who exercise great caution in screening appeals . 10~ 
The importance of DOJ's gatekeeping role, therefore, seems over-
stated . . There is no reason to assume that "[i]f the DO] monopoly 
were removed ... " agencies would "press weak arguments, in perhaps 
insignificant cases, leading to a system-wide loss in credibility" and, 
with it, "a reduction in success because agencies would deplete the 
pool of goodwill generated by the DOJ monopoly." 10~ Instead, it 
seems more likely that agencies will screen cases with some care. This 
is what agencies with litigation authority have done. 104 Moreover, if 
some agencies pursue ill considered cases, it seems likely that those 
agencies-rather than all agencies-will be the ones who will suffer the 
consequences of their actions. 10" 
All that said, we would not expect a decentralized litigation 
scheme to replicate the current arrangement. Agencies would bring 
some cases that DOJ refuses to because in ~eneral agencies are more 
willing to run litigation risks than is DOJ. lti This different attitude 
about risk has the same source as DOJ's relatively greater enthusiasm 
for "technical" defenses-sovereign immunity, lack of jurisdiction, 
statute of limitations-that agencies may be reluctant to rely on.107 
102 Inte rview with Seth Zinmann and Steve Mande ll , lawyers in charge of the screening proc-
ess in 1995, Department of Labor, in Washington, D.C. (March 7, 1995). 
11 ~3 Nicholas S. Zeppos, Government Lawyering: Department of justice Litigation: Externalizing Costs 
and SearchingforSuhsidies, 61 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 , 181 (Spting 1998). 
104 See Devins, supm note 11 (discussing the practices of independent agencies) . 
105 See id. (noting reputational diffe rences among independent agencies). 
10
" Telephone interview with Ray Ludwiszewski, Partner, Gibson , Dunn & Crutcher, former 
Acting Gen . Counsel , USEPA (Dec. 20, 1994) (noting that EPA was mo re willing than DOJ to 
run litigation risks, which resulted at least in part from the fact that the agency itself would not 
get chewed up in court if things went badly) [hereinafter Ludwiszeswki Interview] ; Mugdan In-
terview, supm note 94. But see lnte1view with Allan Eckert, Office of the Gen . Counsel, USEPA, 
in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 13, 1994) (stating that there is not a significant difference between 
EPA lawye rs' willingness to run litigation risks and DOJ lawye rs' willingness to do so). Thus, 
practitioners share a sense that if their case involves "bad facts" for the government, they will be 
more successful in trying to negotiate a settlement with DOJ than with EPA, because DOJ will be 
more sensitive to the possibility of a loss and more conce rned about the impact of a bad prece-
dent on the overall e nforcement effort. 
1117 See HOROWITZ, sufnn note 38, at 41 ("Generally, challenges are me t by a compreh e nsive 
motion for dismissal or summary judgment, often emphasizing jurisdictional and procedural 
arguments and deemphasizing the importance or co mplexity of argume nts on the me rits.") ; 
Catherine J. Lanctot, 171e Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: 
'17w 17zree Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 983 (1991) (noting that "federal government 
lawyers routinely raise procedural and technical defe nses on behalf of their age ncy clienL~"); 
Allan B. Morrison, Drfending the Government: How Vigorous is Too Vigorous?, in VERDICI'S ON 
LAWYERS 242 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976) (noting that gove rnment lawyers are in-
structed, "to paraphrase the closing command in Casablanca, to 'round up the usual defenses"'). 
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The different attitudes toward litigation risk and nonsubstantive 
grounds of decision are predictable given the different interests and 
agendas between DO] and a programmatic agency. For DOJ, success 
is measured solely by winning percentage in the courts; the basis of a 
favorable decision does not matter, and winning is an end in itself. 
For the agency, success is a function of: (a) winning percentage not 
just in the courts, but in an overall enforcement effort most of which 
occurs outside the judiciary; 10H and (b) the advancement of a particu-
lar policy agenda, to which an individual striking judicial victory may 
contribute much more than a particular loss will detract. Thus, an 
agency and DOJ may be in exact agreement in their assessment of the 
likely outcome of a lawsuit the agency wants to bring but still disagree 
as to whether it should be brought. 
Our suggestion is that the agency's greater willingness to run liti-
gation risks can be a strength, not a weakness. 10!' By analogy, consider 
fee-shifting statutes for private litigation. The general understanding 
is that without a fee-shifting statute, potential plaintiffs will bring 
fewer risky cases because the expected return does not justify the risk. 
But by increasing the possible return, the statute encourages plain-
tiffs to bring actions that may not be obvious winners but a certain 
percentage of which will succeed, and that such litigation is a good 
thing in advancing legal change. Risk-taking means more losses, but 
it also means more striking, and law-changing, wins. 
Beyond the question of litigation risks is the question of what sub-
stantive positions, winnable or not, DOJ is willing to pursue or de-
fend. Here again, agency lawyers will tend to be somewhat more 
open-minded. What for DOJ is craftsmanship, to an agency is nit-
Thus, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has complained to Congress that DOJ has far 
too great a tendency to "emphasize procedural over substantive arguments." Richard E. Cohen, 
Government Lauryers Battle for Independence, NAT'L.J., Aug. 12, 1978, at 1286. 
'"" EPA Regional Attorney Walter Mugdan observed that he prevails in almost all administra-
tive cases, and that those vict.ories as well as administrative and judicial settlements "count" for 
him, whereas all that counts for DOJ attorneys are courtroom victories. Thus, if EPA wins only 
two-thirds of iL~ judicial cases, its overall success rate is still near 100% whereas DOJ's is only 
67%. Mugdan Interview, suf>m note 94. 
"" For similar reasons, we think that agency control of settlement agreemenL~ and consent 
decrees will allow agencies best to advance their positions. In particular, in deciding whether to 
settle or to litigate, agencies are more likely than DO.J to focus on their policy priorities rather 
than simply the chance of success in court. Of course, any government lawyer (whether she 
works for the agency or DOJ) may fail to serve the public interest. For example, government 
lawyers may agree to settlement provisions that are too politically costly to embrace in the rule-
making process. For this very reason, Jim Rossi has argued that courts should play an active role 
in reviewing rulemaking set.t.lement.~. Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Proce-
dure: 71te Public Interest in RulemakingSelllmnenl, 51 DUKE LJ 1015 (2001). For Professor Rossi, 
the openness of notice and comment rulemaking protects the public interest; in contrast, agen-
cies who can advance their policy priorities by "negotiating in secret" are apt to sacrifice the 
public interest. /d. 
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picking. 11° For example, EPA has historically been drawn to settle-
ments that include a commitment by the violator to undertake so-
called "Supplemental Environmental Projects," or SEPs. SEPs in-
clude such things as a donation to an environmental group, an envi-
ronmental education program, or construction of a park or wildlife 
sanctuary-beneficial projects that bear no direct connection to the 
violation with which the project sponsor has been charged. EPA has 
always been more enthusiastic about SEPs than has DOJ. For EPA, 
they make sense from the point of view of environmental policy. For 
DOJ, they are dubious as a matter of legality. DOJ has consistently 
expressed reservations about the government's authority to enter into 
a settlement that includes a commitment to do something uncon-
nected to the underlying violation. This is a lawyer's issue, the sort of 
objection that frustrates policymakers. For DOJ, objecting to SEPs is 
an example of professional craft; for EPA, it is niggling. 
Differences between agency and DOJ attitudes underscore the dif-
ficulty of assessing the costs and benefits of DO] gatekeeping. And 
while we do not mean to suggest that DOJ gatekeeping is of little to 
no benefit to agency interests, we do think that the standard DOJ ar-
guments are misleading. They overestimate the benefits of DOJ con-
trol of agency arguments and underestimate the types of screening 
processes that agencies with litigating authority are likely to employ. 
3. Impacts on Agency Activities 
Might the fact that agency regulators know that DOJ will represent 
them in court, should litigation occur, affect the way that they go 
about their jobs? Such an effect would be extraordinarily difficult to 
discern or measure. Nonetheless, it is plausible that agency person-
nel might behave differently in light of the perceived costs or nature 
of litigation. 
In a separate article, we considered the effect that centralization 
might have on agencies' substantive programs. 111 One might imagine 
significant harm to an agency's program if DOJ was an ineffective liti-
gator, so that agencies lost cases they should have won, if DOJ refused 
to bring important, winnable cases or to defend regulations, if DOJ's 
penchant for non-substantive arguments precluded rulings on the 
merits, or if agencies were forgoing judicial enforcement in favor of 
administrative enforcement. 112 Our conclusions were, frankly, disap-
pointingly inconclusive. All of these difficulties are possible, and all 
110 See MINTZ, sujJra note 52, at 31. 
111 See Herz & Devins, supm note 36. 
112 Such an indictment, save for the last point, of DOJ's representation of EPA can be found 
in H.R. Rt:r. No. 95-294, at 333-35 (1977). 
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have occurred in individual instances (although a refusal to defend 
regulations has never been a significant concern). But their signifi-
cance is impossible to quantify, and the problem, if problem it is, will 
vary from setting to setting and depend hugely on the individuals in-
volved, the nature of the administration, and the working relation-
ships that develop. 
Professor Jason Johnston has suggested two other ways in which 
centralized litigation authority might affect the writing of regula-
tions.m Johnston's economic analysis focuses on the fact that the 
costs of litigation are borne by the Justice Department rather than 
the agency, but the benefits of the regulation flow, as between the 
two, to the agency rather than DOJ. Therefore, DOJ's litigation ef-
fort should be expected "to vary much less with the actual net regula-
tory benefits than would the regulatory agency's.""4 In other words, 
for DO], a regulation is a regulation is a regulation; for the agency, 
some are no big deal, for others, it would fight to the death. Johns-
ton suggests that this variation has two consequences: 'Justice De-
partment lawyers tend to over-invest in defending relatively unimpor-
tant regulations (as measured by the agency's perceived net benefit) 
and under-invest in defending relatively significant regulations."''" 
This in turn may affect what regulations get written. In particular, a 
regulation with very high compliance costs but also, from the 
agency's point of view, very high benefits, will generate intense oppo-
sition and a run-of-the-mill DOJ defense, meaning higher chances of 
the regulation being set aside. Anticipating this, the agency may sim-
ply ·forgo the regulation in the first place. On the other hand, the 
agency knows that the DO] will vigorously defend regulations with 
relatively low compliance costs and, therefore, minor opposition. Be-
cause the agency does not bear litigation costs itself, it has an incen-
tive to pursue regulations that impose relatively small costs (even if 
they also have relatively small benefits), because they are most likely 
to be successfully defended by DOJ. Johnston concludes: "Delegation 
of litigation expenses tends to clog the courts with litigation over 
regulations that regulatory agencies would not defend, and therefore 
"" See Jason Scott Johnston, A Gmne-'17!eoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1378-80 (2002). 
114 /d. at 1379. 
"" !d. One might accept that the variation exists without. drawing Johnston's implicit concltl-
sion that the agency's evaluation of the relative importance or benefits of particular regulations 
is correct (although it is one that we tend to share). What he considers greater expertise and 
familiarity with particular situations, unitary-executive enthusiasts might characterize, at least in 
specific instances, as tunnel vision and a failure to go along with the President's program. 
Much of the standard defense of DOJ control of litigation also assumes a variation between 
DO.J's and agencies' evaluations of cases' importance; on this account, it is the agency that will 
under or over-invest in defense of regulations. 
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not finalize in the first place, if they had to bear the full cost of judi-
cial review." 116 
This analysis seems to us plausible but overstated. In particular, 
there is no indication that in fact what is "clogging" the courts are 
challenges to regulations that agencies would not even have issued if 
they bore the burden of defending them. In addition, in the real 
world, while DOJ will lack the agency's commitment to a particular 
regulation, it does have an intense commitment to winning the cases 
it litigates. There is little real-world evidence that once DO] has 
agreed to litigate a case-and it almost always agrees to defend 
agency regulations-it does not try hard enough to win. Put differ-
ently, Johnston's point that DOJ will invest relatively equal resources 
in the defense of all regulations, regardless of their benefits, would be 
irrelevant if those resources were "everything we've got." While of 
course DO] does not spend equal amounts of time and effort on 
every case, its lawyers' own sense of pride is bound up in litigation 
success, and the incentives to try to win are pretty strong. 
In short, the dynamic that Professor Johnston identifies may be 
real, and it argues for greater agency control of litigation. In particu-
lar, it suggests agencies should defend their own regulations. But we 
are inclined to think this effect is quite marginal. 
4. Redundancy and Waste 
The current regime results in a good deal of redundancy. Cases 
are arguably overstaffed; work is repeated; the process is slowed down 
by unnecessary layers of review and reconsideration. There is little 
dispute that "[c]onsiderable delay and waste of resources is usually 
consumed by these overlapping layers of review."117 
It is not enough to counter that in fact all the lawyers involved are 
working hard. All members of a bureaucracy always look like they are 
doing something. That is an important means of bureaucratic sur-
vival. That does not mean that they are doing something, or that what 
they are doing is important, or that they are not simply undoing 
someone else's mistakes. One manifestation of this is that if someone 
is assigned to review or oversee another's work, the higherup can 
only justifY his position by finding fault with what he is reviewing. 
One striking area of overlap is the layered approach to settle-
ments. Hank Habicht, who served in both DOJ and EPA, describes 
the matter succinctly in discussing the fact that the EPA Region, EPA 
Headquarters, and DOJ all have a say with regard to a settlement: 
116 !d. at 1380. 
117 
4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES 
287 n.IOO (1992) (quoting R.A. MacFarlane). 
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This situation is the source of repeated frustration for the private litigant 
who believes he has reached settlement on some issue only to find that 
while it is acceptable to an EPA regional office it will not clear EPA head-
quarters or the Justice Department. For this reason, it is especially im-
portant to establish and understand the authority of the attorneys on the 
other side of the table in an environmental suit. The private litigant 
should anticipate that, if settlement is reached with only part of the gov-
ernmental structure, another office will look for the opportunity to add 
some icing to the settlement cake in order to justify and maintain its posi-
. . h' h IIH tJOn Wit m t e government. 
A second redundancy lies in the repeated reviews of cases during 
the referral process. Many people we interviewed were unable to jus-
tify the duplicative memo writing, with the agency preparing a 
lengthy litigation memo for DOJ, only to have a DOJ attorney write a 
separate, equally lengthy litigation memo. 11!' Of course there is a 
value in having two people have a crack at this task, but it is hard to 
find someone who believes that the gains are worth the time and ef-
fort. 
In the actual conduct of the litigation, there is further redun-
dancy. It is easy to overstate the problem here, and the mere fact that 
an appellate brief goes out over the names of, say, four DOJ lawyers 
and two agency lawyers does not in itself mean that scarce resources 
were squandered employing six lawyers to do what two could have 
done. How many lawyers are actually necessary to write a brief de-
pends on the lawyers and the brief. And having a slew of lawyers on 
the brief does not in itself indicate a waste of resources; even if fifteen 
lawyers are on a brief, it does not mean that they all spent a signifi-
cant amount of time preparing it. Nonetheless, the fact remains that 
if just EPA or just DO] were handling the brief, it would assign fewer 
lawyers to the task. 
The extra effort is not merely the result of additional bodies on 
the case. It also results from the fact that in both enforcement and 
defense matters agency attorneys will have already invested a large 
amount of time in any dispute before DO] becomes involved. When 
DO] attorneys are added, it will take time for them to get up to speed 
on the particular dispute and (usually to a lesser extent) to be edu-
cated in the general program. The result is delay and duplication. 
The question then becomes whether this is a bad thing. Duplica-
tion can have advantages: 
[T] here is something to be said ... on behalf of duplication and overlap. 
In some governmental systems as in many mechanical ones, redundancy 
11
" F. Henry Habicht II, Settling a Case with the Land and Natural Resources Division, in NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 5, 10 (Winter 1985). 
11
" Ludwiszewski Interview, mjml note 106; Mugdan Interview, supra note 94. 
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is useful. Overlapping agencies, like back-up computers on the space 
shuttle, can detect errors; duplicating functions is not always wasteful. 
The problem, of course, is to choose between good and bad redundan-
cies, a matter on which scholars have made little progress. 120 
593 
There are really three points here. First, having a backup is insur-
ance against having the one person assigned to a case turn out to be a 
dud. The value of this insurance, however, is undercut by the hierar-
chical nature of the collaboration. If the DOJ lawyer is the dud, the 
agency lawyer is limited in how much she can compensate, since final 
authority lies with the former. If the agency lawyer is the dud, having 
her on board is only a burden. 
Second, two heads are better than one. This is usually, but not al-
ways true, depending on who the heads are and how well they work 
together. 
Third, collaboration (to use a more optimistic phrase) in litiga-
tion might even be synergistic, with each party enhancing the other's 
strengths and a final product that is greater than the sum of its parts. 
At least one observer has offered such a happy account of the "mul-
titiered" decisionmaking process in government environmentallitiga-
tion.121 We are somewhat less sanguine. Historically, DOJ/agency re-
lations seem to have been an example of destructive acrimony more 
than healthy interaction.122 Such relations are in large measure the 
predictable result of the existing structure and culture, in which a 
group of elite, often younger, often somewhat snooty, lawyers take 
over just when a case is getting interesting, though with the suspicion 
that mission-oriented agency lawyers are unable to see the big pic-
ture. From the point of view of the agency lawyer, the case is taken 
away at the critical moment, after months or years of work, by a know-
nothing generalist. From the point of view of the DOJ lawyer, any 
J:ro JAMES Q. \NILSON, BUREAUCRACY 274 (1989). For a general. rather abstract, defense of 
duplication of systems within bureaucracies, see Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the 
Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 ( 1969). Landau concludes: 
"Streamlining an agency," "consol'dating similar functions," "eliminating duplication," 
and "commonality" are powerful slogans which possess an obvious appeal. But it is just 
possible that their achievement would dept;ve an agency of the properties it needs 
most-those which allow rules to be broken and units to operate effectively without do-
ing cdtical injury to the agency as a whole. Accordingly, it would be far more construe· 
tive, even under conditions of scarcity, to lay aside easy slogans and turn attention to a 
principle which lessens risks without foreclosing opportunity. 
ld. at 356. Unfortunately, Landau does not identify that principle. 
121 Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 452·53 
( 1992) (offering a glowing account of the cooperative case preparation by lawyers, technical 
staff, and policymakers within EPA, Main Justice, and the U.S. Attorney's Offices). Tobias is 
offering an explanation for why Rule 11 sanctions are virtually none xistent in this area of the 
law (which is not to suggest that the best the government can do is to avoid such sanctions). 
ITl See, e.g., Gaynor, supra note 100, at 9, 1 I (discussing such problems). 
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challenges or set-backs are easily attributed to mistakes made before 
DO] got the case. 123 
These difficulties are not eliminated when an agency litigates its 
own cases, because some of the same structures, with their attendant 
acrimony and jealousies, are recreated within the agency. Indeed, 
one sees something of the same phenomenon within DOJ with re-
gard to the Solicitor General's control of Supreme Court litigation. 
Nonetheless, they are significantly reduced because all the players are 
on the same team. 
C. Summary 
The standard arguments for DO] control of litigation seem over-
blown. Were litigation authority to be decentralized, there is good 
reason to think that agencies would screen cases, hire top flight law-
yers, and usually make arguments similar to those now made by DO] 
lawyers. There would be less waste and redundancy. Interagency 
conflicts might increase, but it may be that the President, in fact, pre-
fers that a certain amount of conflict bubble over. And while agen-
cies would sometimes make riskier arguments than DOJ, undertaking 
those risks would in some instances significantly advance the agency's 
substantive agenda. 
None of this is to say that DOJ centralization is necessarily a mis-
take. Rather, we have simply shown that the standard arguments are 
vulnerable and, as such, it is appropriate to reconsider whether the 
current arrangement should be reconfigured. It is to that task that 
we now turn. 
Ill. STRUCTURING THE AGENCY/DO] RELATIONSHIP 
The Department of Justice is engaged in a never-ending task of 
determining when the U.S. Attorneys' offices will handle cases on 
their own and when main Justice will be involved as well or instead. 
Many agencies face a similar struggle to define the division of author-
ity between headquarters and the regions. EPA purports to follow a 
"value-added approach to case involvement"; headquarters staff will 
1
" As one author wrote about the prosecution of white-collar crime in general some years 
ago: 
The agency attorneys assigned to the local federal prosecutor are usually treated as "sec-
ond class" assistants . . . . [T] he agency attorneys feel that they are asked to act as 
"clerks" for the local prosecutor. There is a reluctance among many agency attorneys to 
work with a local federal prosecutor. There is no "status," no enjoyment in prosecuting a 
case, and certainly no "glory." When the matter is tin ally prosecuted, if it succeeds, the 
US Attorney receives the gl01y and credit. If it fails, the agency often gel~ the blame. 
August Bequai, Vl'hite-Collar Plea Bargaining, TRIAL, July 1977, at 38, 41. 
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be involved in cases when in doing so they "add valt1e." 1 ~4 The same 
test can be applied to the allocation of overall lawyering tasks. The 
question is in what settings would agency lawyers be equal or even su-
perior to DO] lawyers, and in which do DOJ attorneys "add value." 
Where the benefits of DOJ representation are relatively low, and/ or 
the costs relatively high, it makes sense to shift litigating responsibility 
to the agencies. 
The costs of any such change would not be insignificant. Indi-
viduals would likely be reassigned, sometimes to their dismay. 
Agency management structures, hiring, training, and space would 
need to change. A full-scale dismantling of DOJ is inconceivable if 
for no other reason than the "transaction costs" involved-not that 
we would propose it in any event. The costs of change are themselves 
one argument in favor of the status quo. On the other hand, such 
costs would be short-lived and would not be dramatic in the case of 
marginal adjustments. Therefore, we begin with a presumption in fa-
vor of, but not an inflexible commitment to, the existing structure. 
In this part we consider first what sort of taxonomy is appropriate 
for categorizing the cases in which decentralized litigation authority 
might be appropriate. We then examine the different categories of 
cases, concluding that the uneasy case for DOJ control for the most 
part has been made. However, we would shift litigation authority 
away from DOJ and to agency attorneys in two settings: (a) trial, but 
not appellate, civil enforcement proceedings; and (b) petitions for 
judicial review of regulations. 
A. Choosing a Taxonomy 
One could draw these lines according to the issues at stake or ac-
cording to the type of case being litigated. For the reasons that fol-
low, we almost always favor the latter. 
l. Distinguishing Strategy from Policy 
DO] has always said that it cannot and should not displace the 
agency's policymaking function. 1 ~5 Accordingly, DO] should only 
'"' Memorandum from Steven A. Herman , Assistant Administrator, USEPA, to Assistant Ad-
ministrators et al. , Redelebration of Authority and Guidance on Headquarters Involvement in 
Regulatory Enforcement Cases 2 Ouly 11, 1994), available at http:/ /www.epa.gov/ 
Compliance/ resources/ policies/ civil/rcra/hqregenfcases-mem.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2003) . 
12
'' See Bell, supra note 76, at 1061 (noting DOJ's obligation to accede to "the policy preroga-
tives of our agency clients"); Devins, supra note 87, at .279 (describing a model that "envisions 
the affected agent or department as the policy-making client, and agency counsel of the Justice 
Department as the dutiful advocate"); Olson, sufmt note 72, at 82 (describing DOJ's official po-
sition as being "the Department does not make policy-that is the responsibility and the right 
of the client agencies") . 
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make decisions about litigation strategy, not substantive policy. Ex-
perience has shown, and one might have predicted, that assigning 
tasks according to this distinction will not work. For one thing, that is 
a near impossible line to draw. Not only is there a large class of "pol-
icy" questions that are not peculiar to the particular agency-for ex-
ample, federalism-but distinguishing strategy and policy here is 
doomed. Even if we could agree on the distinction in theory, some-
one would have to apply it, that is, decide which is which. The result-
ing jurisdictional battles would be unseemly, unproductive, time-
consuming, and likely to lead to DO] dominance. Finally, for reasons 
we will soon detail, dividing authority along these lines does not cap-
ture the sort of situations in which it would be appropriate to shift 
litigating authority to the agency. 
In short, the policy/strategy distinction is, in theory, in place. It is 
working about as well as it can. Announcing it, even with enthusiasm 
and fanfare, would not be a change. Using it as a basis for allocating 
lawyering tasks would fail. 
2. Distinguishing Agency-Specific Issues from General Issues 
A somewhat more promising way of distinguishing between DO] 
issues and agency issues would be to ask under what statute they arise. 
All constitutional questions, and all questions that arise under stat-
utes that cut across agency boundaries (FOIA, the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the Sunshine Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Federal Torts Claim Act) could be for DOJ; those arising under the 
specific substantive statutes could be for the agency. While such a di-
vision of labor makes a certain amount of sense, it is hard to see how 
it could be effectively implemented. For one, the lines will not always 
be clear; for another, individual cases are likely to involve both sets of 
issues. At the same time, the benefits of such a division can be real-
ized through mechanisms for allocating tasks rather than cases accord-
ing to the nature of the issue. As we explain below, such mechanisms 
need not rely on the cooperation and good faith of individual attor-
neys. 
In short, we do not think it possible to shift greater authority to 
agencies according to distinctions between types of issues that arise in 
litigation. Practically and conceptually, it is more fruitful to think in 
terms of allocating litigating authority for particular types of lawsuits. 
B. Decentralized Counseling 
To start at one extreme, it might be argued that what should be 
expanded is the role of DO] lawyers. Perhaps DO] ought to play a 
greater role in counseling, as the creators of DO] in 1870 anticipated. 
DO] has to defend the agency's decisions in court; it will be able to 
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do so more effectively if it has the greater familiarity with the statu-
tory scheme and the particulars of the challenged action or regula-
tion that comes from working on its development. In addition, it may 
be that agency lawyers are too committed to the narrow mission of 
the agency and lack the detachment necessary to see the big picture 
or the neutrality to adhere to legal requirements. Indeed, because 
legal counseling is a form of, or overlaps with, policymaking, under 
the executive hierarchy model the President's chief legal officer, or 
her designee, should influence agency decision making. Finally, DOJ 
could ensure. consistency between agencies. 
Although these considerations are not negligible, they are in the 
final analysis unconvincing. The first is absolutely true, but, we think, 
not a sufficient reason for bringing DOJ into agencies' decision mak-
ing process. For the reasons we discuss below, it is more a reason for 
ensuring that agency lawyers are adequately involved in defending 
the action in court. 
The second reason-agency lawyers' parochial excess of loyalty to 
the agency's policy goals-seems overstated. For the most part, 
agency lawyers will raise the same objections and concerns during the 
rulemaking process that DOJ lawyers would raise were they more in-
timately involved . 1 ~6 Even in the individual instances where it is argu-
able that DOJ attorneys might have steered the rulemaking in a 
slightly different direction, it is not at all clear that this is because 
DOJ is "neutral" whereas the agency lawyers are "partisan." While 
DOJ has a strong tradition of independence and legal professional-
ism, we take that self-image with a grain of salt. Agency attorneys will 
have a tendency to provide the sought-for answer, but so will DOJ at-
torneys, just for a different client. 
The third argument-the need for DOJ control of legal policy-
making-also fails. For one thing, it directly contradicts the second 
argument; instead of focusing on the need for independent legal 
judgment, this argument justifies DOJ control on the opposite 
ground that something other than independent legal judgment is 
needed. Accepting that is what is at stake, then involving DOJ at the 
predecision stage risks a significant intrusion on agency policymaking 
authority. We accept the principle that executive branch policymak-
ing should be hierarchical and subject to some overall centralized ex-
ecutive oversight. 1 ~7 However, DOJ involvement is the least appropri-
126 Telephone inteJView with John Nagle, Seton Hall University School of Law, former Attor-
ner,, Environment Division, U.S. Dep't of justice (Mar. 24, 1995). 
27 Presidential control of agency rulemaking-from the Nixon quality of life review through 
the Reagan Executive Order 12,291 and the Bush Competitiveness Council, to Clinton's E.O. 
12,866, which has been left essentially intact by the second Bush administration-has generated 
more than a little controversy. Nonetheless·, there is a remarkable overall consensus, in which 
we share, that presidential oversight of the feder<~l rulemaking apparatus is appropriate and 
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ate and effective way of achieving that goal. Not only are other 
mechanisms for doing so in place, but the goals of accountability and 
coordination are paramount when an agency is formulating policy, 
not when it is merely determining what Congress already has found 
the appropriate policy to be. 12K 
The argument for DOJ counseling is strongest in situations of 
agency disagreement. No claim can be made for a particular pro-
gram agency's expertise or authority; by definition there is a competi-
tion between two agencies. Here an ultimate decision maker is 
needed not because of a linear hierarchy but because dispute resolu-
tion requires an ultimate decisionmaker. Thus, DOJ's role under 
E.O. 12,146 is sensible and appropriate, 12\l but it should not extend 
beyond that. 
As for the consistency argument, it is not especially strong in the 
counseling context and certainly less strong than in the litigation 
context. Uniformity of an important sort is achieved by having an 
Environmental Protection Agency, rather than a Water Protection 
Agency, an Air Protection Agency, etc., all operating independently. 
In addition, EPA's statutes are different from OSHA's, which are dif-
ferent from the Department of Transportation's, and so on. There is 
large, inescapable, congressionally created disuniformity between dif-
ferent agencies that undercuts the claim that a single lawyer is 
needed for them all in order to ensure consistency. And even to the 
extent different agencies consider recurrent or overlapping issues, 
there may be a value in allowing each to work it out for itself to en-
sure that these issues receive the fullest development and considera-
tion. In short, agencies, like states, can be Brandeisian laboratories. 
Finally, making DOJ the sole legal counselor to the entire federal 
bureaucracy would be virtually impossible simply as a practical mat-
ter. The point is not just one of resources, although plainly DOJ 
important. See, e.g. , American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Practice, Twenty-First Century Governance: lmjnoving the Federal Administrative Process-A RejJort for the 
President-Elect of the United StatP.s, 52 ADMIN . L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2000) (recommending tha t the 
President "should promote coordination, efficiency, and openness in agency rulemaking 
by .. . overseeing a carefully-executed process of centralized review of significant agency regula-
tions"); Admin . Con f. of the U.S., Recommendation 88-9, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 42, 
42 ( 1988) ("An effective mechanism is needed to coordinate agency decisions with the judg-
ments of officials having a broader perspective, such as the President and Congress."). 
'" See Michae l He rz, Imposing Unified Executive 13mnch Statutory lnterjJretation, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 219,251-70 (1993) . 
'"'' E.O. 12,146 requires agencies "whose heads se rve at the pleasure of the President" to 
submit to the Attorney General disputes over who can "administer a particular program or . .. 
regulate a particular activity." In pr<~ctice, this means that disputes between agencies without 
litigiating authority will be resolved by DO.J and without going to court. However, agencies that 
possess independent litib'<lting authority may assert jurisdiction and leave it to the court.~ to stop 
them. 
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would have to grow many-fold to truly take over the counseling func-
tion for each executive agency. It is also that even if DO] was given 
the resources to do this task, it would no longer resemble DO]. It 
would become so far-flung as to be beyond the capacity of the Attor-
ney General, or her relatively immediate subordinates, to oversee. In 
other words, it would be impossible to "centralize" counseling in any 
meaningful way given the sheer size of the federal apparatus. 
C. Criminal Litigation130 
At the opposite extreme from counseling is criminal prosecution. 
DOJ's exclusive control over federal criminal prosecutions has largely 
gone unchallenged. It sounds right to most people. Nonetheless, 
proposals for private prosecution are sometimes made, and some 
writers hav~ a:gued that agencies sho~ld ~ossess _at least som~ inde-
pendent cnmmal enforcement authonty. · Particular attentiOn re-
cently has been given to granting the SEC power to bring criminal 
prosecutions in light of recent corporate scandals and a perceived 
lack of sufficient ferocity on DOJ's part with regard to white-collar 
0 132 
cnme. 
We do not propose an increased litigation role for agency attor-
neys in criminal litigation. For the reasons that follow, the arguments 
for DO] control are particularly potent in the criminal setting. (As 
we shall see, their relative diluteness in the civil setting provides an 
instructive comparison.). 
As we write this, in the shadow of Enron, Worldcom, and similar 
scandals, the prevailing public and congressional sense is that the se-
curities laws have been under-enforced, that we should be sending 
more_ executives t~Jail, and ~hat a redoubli~g of S~C enforcement _ef-
forts IS called for. · An obvtous way to achteve thts would be to giVe 
130 For a more comprehensive discussion of the issues in this section, see Michael Herz, Struc-
tures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 679 (1996), from which the 
following is drawn. 
131 Writing about environmental crimes in 1991, Robert Adler and Charles Lord of the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council urged that EPA be given greater independent enforcement au-
thority. While conceding that DOJ should be "brought in for the most egregious violations that 
require more complex enforcement actions," Adler and Lord felt that EPA should be able to act 
on its own for initial or less complicated violations. Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environ-
mental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781, 812 (1991). 
'"' See, e.g., Ensuring Corporate Responsibility: Using Criminal Sanctions to Deter Wrongdoing, Hem~ 
ing Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 108th Cong. (2002) (testimony of James R Doty, for-
mer General Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (arguing against granting SEC criminal en-
forcement authority), available at http:/ /judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm ?id=329&wit_id=768 (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2003). 
"' See, e.g., Leaf et al., supra note 17, at 70: 
[T]he SEC's power ... lies more in persuasion than in punishment. The commission 
can force companies to comply with securities rules, it can fine them when they don't, it 
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the SEC power to bring its own criminal prosecutions without DO]. 
At present, the SEC refers more cases than DOJ brings; its attorneys 
are (speaking relatively and generally) more committed to the regu-
latory cause and place a higher priority on securities prosecutions; 
the duplication of effort inherent in referral and prosecution by DO] 
automatically reduces enforcement resources. In light of these cir-
cumstances, it would seem that enforcement would be enhanced by 
allowing SEC to bring its own prosecutions. 134 There is reason to be 
concerned, however, about agency lawyers armed with independent 
criminal prosecution authority going too far. 
First, generations of administrative law scholars and DOJ attorneys 
have assumed that agencies have tunnel vision and are unable to per-
ceive countervailing factors that should make a reasonable person 
hesitate about the agency's single-minded pursuit of its particular 
mission. While these complaints may be overstated, it is undoubtedly 
true that agency attorneys are more apt than DOJ lawyers to prose-
cute morally blameless conduct that violates an incomprehensible 
technicality. Consider, for example, SEC attorneys. Not only are they 
likely to have a particular commitment to securities enforcement, but 
they know the statutes and regulations perhaps too well, failing to 
appreciate how overwhelming and confusinf? they are too someone 
whose entire job is not understanding them.' .. • 
Second, recall the differences in lawyering style between DO] and 
agency attorneys. Because they are, relatively speaking, generalists 
without an affiliation to a particular programmatic agenda, DOJ law-
yers tend to be (a) more interested in "technical" lawyers' arguments 
and (b) less willing to run litigation risks, than their agency counter-
parts."''; These attributes can be frustrating to agency lawyers, particu-
larly in defensive cases. But they are important safeguards in the 
criminal context. 
Third, DOJ's arguments about consistency are especially powerful 
in the criminal setting. Because the sanction is so severe and the 
stakes so high, the norm of treating like cases alike is compelling 
here. The same impulse that lies behind the creation of the sentenc-
can even charge them in civil court with violating the law. But it can't drag anybody off 
to prison. To that end, the SEC's enforcement division must work with federal and state 
prosecutors-a game that often turns into weak cop/bad cop. 
'" Cf Adler & Lord, sufmt note 131, at 812 (making a similar argument for EPA authority to 
prosecute environmental crimes). 
""' While this is the dominant concern, the threat of overzealousness does not come solely 
from the agency. See Herz, supra note 130, at 708-09. It is sometimes argued that criminal 
prosecutions of regulatory offenses have gotten out of hand precisely because they are pursued 
by individual prosecutors (often with other political ambitions) mther than by the expert agency 
operating in a transparent and even-handed manner. See, e.g., Susan Geiger & Elizabeth Flem-
ing, '111e Criminalization of the lwgulatory Process, 10 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNCIL 19 (2002). 
'"" See supra notes I 06-07 and accompanying text. 
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ing guidelines, which were supposed to eliminate disparities in the 
sentencing of similar defendants who had committed similar crimes, 
of course applies to the criminal enforcement regime generally. 
Fairness and consistency are inescapably enhanced by centralization. 
The SEC might overemphasize securities prosecutions at the expense 
of other criminal enforcement priorities. 
The final standard argument for DO] litigating authority is that 
the agency's substantive expertise is outweighed by the department's 
litigation expertise. In a petition for review of an agency regulation, 
the agency lawyer's familiarity with the details and history of statute, 
regulation, and overall regulatory scheme are an important advan-
tage that litigating experience does little to counterbalance. In the 
criminal setting, however, the situation is just the opposite. There is a 
separate litigator's skill, wholly independent of the particular substan-
tive law violated, in criminal prosecutions-more so than in any other 
area of litigation. As many have noted, environmental attorneys 
learned this the hard way in the early 1980s. m Technical environ-
mental expertise is much less important. Indeed, if one really needs 
the highly specialized understanding of the statutes and regulations 
found only in the agency in order effectively to prosecute a case, it is 
surely a case that should not have been brought as a criminal prose-
cution in the first place. 
One final point about expertise. DOJ also claims a sort of "exper-
tise" in its supposed neutrality and objectivity. As a general proposi-
tion this is a valid but limited point. However, it has some force in 
the criminal setting. Regulatory enforcement is multi-tiered; it al-
most never begins with a criminal prosecution. If a matter has 
reached that stage, it is almost always because the defendant is a re-
peat violator, or particularly recalcitrant, and administrative efforts to 
achieve compliance have failed. By this point, the agency and the de-
fendant know each other. The dispute can easily become personal. 
Again, if the concern is excessive prosecutions, that concern would be 
especially strong when the prosecutor is angry at the defendant and 
has a personal stake in the prosecution. Turning to a new attorney 
outside the agency is therefore an important protection. 
137 See, e.g., Lazams, supra note 18, at 2460-61; Starr, suj>ra note 16, at 907. The usual example 
of an EPA attorney in over his head is United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979), in 
which the EPA lawyer's appearance before the grand jury as both attorney and witness resulted 
in the dismissal of the indictment. See also DOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note16; Lazarus, .mjmt 
note 18, at 2460-61 n.240; Starr, suj>ra note 16, at 906. 
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D. Supreme Court Litigation 
Supreme Court litigation is another area where centralization of 
litigation authority makes sense. 13H With the Supreme Court hearing 
only a handful of the thousands of cases that agencies are a party to 
each year, the executive is well served by the current system. In par-
ticular, Solicitor General control of litigation helps the government 
in three distinctive ways. First, as the Court recognized in 1988, 
" [ w] ithout the centralization of the decision whether to seek certio-
rari, [we] might well b.e deluged ~th,g,etitions from ever_y federal 
prosecutor, agency, or mstrumentahty. · · More to the pomt, agen-
cies (focusing on their regulatory agenda) are likely to overestimate 
both the doctrinal and practical significance of lower court defeats. 
Consequently, if agencies could petition the Court for certiorari, 
there would be a dramatic increase in the number of petitions. Were 
this to happen, the Court could not give special deference to peti-
tions for certiorari filed by government agencies. In contrast, the Jus-
tices typically grant certiorari in roughly seventy percent of the cases 
that the Solicitor General presents to the Court (as compared to a 
five percent success rate for private litigants) .140 Agencies therefore 
are unlikely to benefit from a decentralized system in which they 
need to convince the Justices that there case is cert-worthy; instead, 
agencies may stand a better chance of securing Supreme Court re-
view by participating in the current system. 
Second, since no agency regularly appears before the Court, 
agencies cannot replicate the experience and talents of the Solicitor 
General. By centralizing Supreme Court litigation in a single office, 
the Solicitor General regularly recruits the best and the brightest, 
who then gain experience that sets them apart. When it comes to 
oral arguments, brief writing, etc., Solicitor General lawyers have an 
advantage over lawyers who rarely participate in Supreme Court liti-
gation. Finally, Solicitor General lawyers, like the Justices themselves, 
are likely to have a generalist perspective, to focus on Supreme Court 
precedent, and to emphasize a case's broader ramifications. The re-
sult of all this that Solicitor General lawyers are extremely effective 
advocates. 141 
'"" As the Court itself is wholly convinced. See supra note 58 and cases cited therein. 
'"' United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 ( 1988). 
140 See SALOKAR, supra note 41, at 25. 
141 We do not mean to suggest that agency lawyers would not do reasonably well before the 
Court. Indeed, independent agency lawyers who have argued cases before the Court have done 
nearly as well as Solicitor General lawyers. See Devins, supra note II (explaining why the argu-
ment for Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation is overstated). 
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Third, the costs and benefits of a Supreme Court decision are 
"larger for the federal government than for other litigants." 14~ The 
Supreme Court does not limit itself to correcting the mistakes of 
lower courts; instead, Supreme Court decisions have greater "scope 
and scale" than lower court decisions and, as such, "are likely to affect 
agencies, companies, or individuals not parties to the original suit."143 
For this reason, the government must exercise great care in deciding 
which cases to ask the Court to hear. Since any Supreme Court deci-
sion is likely to cut across agencies, the Solicitor General has a strong 
incentive to manipulate the Court's docket in ways that favor the gov-
ernment.144 Needless to say, such manipulation can only be managed 
by a centralized gatekeeper. 
E. Civil Litigation 
In contrast to criminal prosecutions and litigation before the Su-
preme Court, in the civil setting in the lower courts the arguments in 
favor of DOJ litigating authority are significantly more dilute. In-
deed, in two settings we think they may be outweighed by the 
agency's need to develop an effective and coherent enforcement re-
gime and agency attorneys' greater familiarity with the relevant law 
and regulations. 
Some civil cases, however, are best left in the hands of DOJ. First, 
agencies are sometimes sued for violating a statute/regulation as to 
which they have no subject matter expertise. Examples include em-
ployment discrimination, labor, and worker safety. Here, the issue 
cuts across all of government, so there may be significant costs of an 
agency defeat. Here, DOJ centralization makes sense. DOJ is better 
positioned than the agency to develop expertise. In particular, DOJ 
can have a group of attorneys that focus on one of these issues; agen-
cies, in contrast, will not handle enough of these cases to develop that 
type of expertise. Moreover, there is significant risk of spillover costs. 
Second, for similar reasons, DOJ centralization makes sense in 
cases involving FOIA, the Sunshine Act, and other cross-cutting stat-
utes. If a case focused on only one of these cross-cutting statutes, 
DO] should handle it. On the other hand, these types of issues might 
arise in a case that is otherwise best handled by agency lawyers. When 
that happens, DOJ should be able to screen the relevant portions of 
briefs and other filings. Moreover, DOJ should prepare a litigation 
manual specifying what can and cannot be argued in court. 
1
" Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Gnvermnenl Litigant Advantage: Implications for 
the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 402 (2000) . 
.. , !d. at 397. 
144 See generally id. (supporting the claim that th e Solicitor Gene ral has such incentive). 
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Third, in cases involving constitutional challenges to a statute or 
regulation, DOJ should handle the defense. In critical respects, Con-
gress is the real client in these cases. This is obviously true when 
there is a direct challenge to a statute. 145 But it is often also true in 
constitutional challenges to agency regulations; for example, these 
challenges sometimes turn on a court's view of whether Congress 
would delegate to an agency the power to craft a regulation that 
raises serious constitutional questions. 146 Also, there are significant 
spillover costs in constitutional cases, both Congress and other agen-
cies must navigate constitutional rulings when pursuing their legisla-
tive/regulatory agendas. 
Finally, since constitutional cases cut across all of government, 
DO] has more expertise than agency lawyers. Of course, it may be 
that a constitutional issue is raised in a case that otherwise should be 
handled by agency lawyers. When this happens, DOJ should screen 
both filings and oral arguments. 
In cases more directly based in an agency's regulatory program, 
however, we believe it would make sense to shift litigating authority to 
the agency. First, when an agency regulation is challenged (almost 
always, on the administrative record in a Court of Appeals), agency 
attorneys will have important advantages over DO] attorneys. They 
will be more familiar with the specifics of the regulation and its de-
velopment, as well as the surrounding statutory scheme. An on-the-
administrative-record review of an agency rule is likely to involve 
complex legal questions requiring familiarity with the agency's pro-
grams and the history of the rule, and is less likely to turn on knowing 
the tricks of the litigation trade. To be sure, in many settings inti-
mate familiarity can be a disadvantage in litigation: the case must be 
made to a generalist (the judge), not another specialist; the lawyer's 
personal investment in the action being defended can cloud his 
, . .,, For this very reason, Dq) treats constitutional challenges to federal statutes differently 
than other types of cases. In particular, DOJ claims that it will defend federal statutes whenever 
a good faith argument can be advanced in support of the statute. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Two 
PersjJectives on the Solicitor General's lndejlenrlence, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1119, 1155 (1988) ("The 
constitutionality of acl~ of Congress is to be defended in all cases, unless no professionally re-
spectable argument can be made in defense of the statute."): Seth Waxman, Defending Congress, 
79 N.C. L. REV. IOn, 1088 (2001). For additional discussion, see Neal Devins, Politics nnrl Prin-
cijJ!e: An Alte'l'native Take on Seth P. Waxman:f Defending Congress, 81 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 
June 2003) (suggesting that politics and ideology may enter into the Solicitor General's deci-
sion to defend the constitutionality of federal statutes). 
, ... ; See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 222 ( 1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In a society 
that abhors censorship and in which policymakers have traditionally placed the highest value on 
the freedom to communicate, it. is unrealistic to conclude that statutory authority t.o regulate 
conduct implicitly amhorized t.he Executive to regulate speech ."); Kent. v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 
129 ( 1958) (assuming Congress did not. want to delegate the power to make rules interfering 
with basic human liberties). 
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judgment and/or make him too unwilling to yield; the lawyer's per-
sonal commitment and confidence in the challenged regulation may 
blind him to pitfalls or weaknesses. These concerns are very real. 
However, they are relatively weaker in the challenge to a regulation 
than in the enforcement setting. Moreover, in a defensive case, the 
deed is done; the regulation has been promulgated, now it needs the 
best defense. DOJ virtually never declines to defend regulations, so 
its much vaunted capacity to objectively review the case is given no 
room to operate here. 147 We would transfer the defense of regula-
tions from DOJ to the agency. 
Second, there may be some defense cases that are so straightfor-
ward that DOJ cannot add value. For example, EPA is frequently 
sued for failing to issue a regulation within a statutory deadline. It is 
generally understood that EPA cannot meet all its deadlines, and as a 
practical matter its regulatory agenda is set in part by what it chooses 
to work on and in part by what the environmental community de-
cides to sue it over. The legal claims in these cases are utterly 
straightforward: the statute requires that something be done by a date 
certain, and EPA has failed to meet the deadline. The plaintiff will 
win, the only question is the relief. That in tum is a function of how 
much time the agency can convince the plaintiff or the judge it needs 
to complete the task. DOJ is not needed for such a negotiation and 
has little to bring to the table. 
Third, we would argue, though with somewhat less confidence, 
that agency lawyers should decide when to bring, and should then 
handle, civil judicial enforcement actions in the district courts. Sev-
eral gains would be had by doing so. The agency's overall enforce-
ment program will be better served by being able to decide when to 
pursue civil judicial enforcement. Agency lawyers will know the case 
best, and be familiar with its history. Technical or specialized issues, 
both legal and scientific, are more likely to be involved than in crimi-
nal or Supreme Court cases. The present regime involves significant 
redundancies and duplication of effort; leaving these actions to the 
agency would be more efficient. Moreover, while there is some risk 
that overzealous agency lawyers will pursue weak cases, we think that 
agencies are likely to develop workable screening procedures. 14x Fi-
nally, if allowed to pursue civil judicial enforcement cases, agency 
147 For this very reason, agency lawyers perceive DOJ as having the strongest sense of the 
agency <L~ client in cases involving challenges to agency regulations. See Herz & Devins, supra 
note 36, at 1366 (discussing EPA attitudes towards the Environmental Defense Section). 
''" It is also noteworthy that DOJ typically pursues referrals. For example, from 1989-1992, 
DO] approved anywhere from 73% to 93% of EPA referrals. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of 
Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not be a Crowd When Enforcement Au-
thority is Shared &y the United States, the StatP.s, and their Citizens, 54 Mo. L. REV. 1552, 161 ~14 n.348 
(1995). 
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lawyers will no longer have an incentive to pursue relatively weaker 
administrative enforcement devices to avoid D0f49 This will allow 
enforcement alternatives to be chosen on the merits. 
The advantages of agency control of civil judicial enforcement in 
the district courts, however, do not extend to the federal court of ap-
peals. In cases where an agency loses in the trial court, there is rea-
son to question the adequacy of agency screening and, as such, DOJ 
screening may weed out weak cases and weak arguments. Also, 
agency expertise is less critical than litigation experience in appeals 
of civil enforcement cases (especially as compared to challenges to 
agency rulemaking). Specifically, although sometimes raising special-
ized issues, appellate enforcement cases typically do not involve 
highly technical issues. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has called for a rethinking of DOJ control of govern-
ment litigation. By highlighting limits in the standard argument, we 
have shown how the interests of executive agencies (and the Presi-
dent who manages them) might well be served by a modest recon-
figuration of lawyering tasks. And while it is unlikely that anyone in 
Congress or the executive branch will pursue our reform agenda/"0 
we do hope that this article will prompt a rethinking of the justifica-
tions for centralizing litigation in DOJ. In our view, proponents of 
DOJ centralization have yet to make their case. That is not to say that 
they cannot make their case; it is to say that they should take aim at 
our analysis and explain why-notwithstanding limits in the standard 
argument-DO] centralization is sound public policy. 
'"' See Herz & Devins, snfJra note 36, at I 369-71. 
'"' For a detailed explanation, see Devins & Herz, .wftra note 54. 
